KNOWING WHAT WORKS

Evidence from Central Project Evaluations of Transitional Development Assistance Projects

Cross-section Analysis

Main Report

On behalf of GIZ by external evaluators

giz Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH

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Abbreviations

AV	Auftragsverantwortlicher (on-site project manager)
CEval	Center for Evaluation
CPE	Central project evaluation
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
IDP	Internally displaced people
(I)PCA	(Integrated) Peace and Conflict Assessment
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
LNOB	Leave no one behind
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
TDA	Transitional development assistance
ToC	Theory of change
ToR	Terms of reference
PMI	Programmmanager Inland (programme manager in Germany)
QCA	Qualitative comparative analysis
QSA	Querschnittsanalyse (Cross-sectional analysis/evaluation synthesis)
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene

Executive summary

Introduction

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH commissioned CEval GmbH to conduct an **evaluation synthesis** of a sample of 10 central project evaluations (CPE) in the field of **transitional development assistance (TDA).** The overarching objective of the evaluation synthesis was to assess and generate evidence on a number of key issues focusing on a) general trends and challenges, and b) key factors for project success and the avoidance of non-intended negative results. For this purpose, results and conclusions from the project evaluations and other selected strategy and concept papers were aggregated, qualitatively analysed and presented (Block A). Subsequently, new evidence on the influence of different factors on project success and the avoidance of unintended negative effects was generated via a qualitative comparative analysis (Block B).

By providing recommendations for improving TDA projects, the evaluation synthesis should contribute to the identification of good practices and lessons learned, and thus, to enhancing future projects.

Methodology

The evaluation synthesis was based on a mixed-method approach. To answer the research questions a qualitative *content* analysis (Block A) and a fuzzy-set qualitative *comparative* analysis (fsQCA) (Block B) were carried out. For both analyses, an analysis grid was developed and evaluation questions were structured accordingly. As a first step, all reports were qualitatively analysed, using MAXQDA®. This enabled the identification of TDA-related and context-specific factors for the success and failure of the projects, like standard/exemplary indicators as a feature of rather successful projects, typical side effects and overarching conclusions. The inductive development of the category system ensured that all relevant influencing factors were taken into account, which effectively avoided deductive fallacies (due to an incomplete analytical framework). Furthermore, the findings could be quantified and the strength of evidence identified by this evaluation synthesis therefore assessed. As well as the document analysis, primary data were collected in interviews with project staff. The calculation of the fsQCA (Block B) led to the generation of new evidence regarding different combinations of causal conditions that contribute to the success of TDA projects and the absence of non-intended negative effects.

Key findings

A total of **40 success and failure factors of TDA projects was identified**, clustered into four main categories: general political, economic and environmental conditions; managerial factors; cooperation factors; and implementation concept-related factors. The most frequently cited project-related success factors within the projects' spheres of influence included: constant dialogue with stakeholders (cited by 10 out of 10), conflict sensitivity (eight out of 10), staff composition (e.g. quantity, level of competence) (seven out of 10), linking of the intervention to local structures (seven out of 10), participatory approach (seven out of 10), adaptive project management (six out of 10), coordination with other actors (five out of 10), commitment of project staff (five out of 10), ownership (five out of 10) and sufficient financial resources (five out of 10).

The **humanitarian-development-peace nexus (HDP nexus – also known as the triple nexus) was not fully addressed in any of the projects**. However, three projects combined humanitarian activities (e.g.

construction of water boreholes in refugee camps, emergency feeding of livestock, reconstruction work in refugee camps after flooding) with sustainable development activities (e.g. rehabilitation of infrastructure) and thus partially addressed the HDP nexus, i.e. a double nexus. One of the **strengths** of these projects was the response to spontaneous needs in the field, which led to the inclusion of humanitarian activities in the implementation. Yet, a clear **weakness** was the insufficient consideration of joint coordination and implementation with actors working in the peacebuilding sector (and beyond).

The assessment of the **SMARTness of indicators revealed considerable weaknesses** in some cases. In 38% of the cases, the indicator quality was low, i.e. project indicators covered less than 50% of the SMART criteria, or rather low, i.e. project indicators covered between 51% and 64% of the SMART criteria. In the remainder, indicator quality was rated as rather high (project indicators covered between 65% and 79% of the SMART criteria) or high (project indicators covered min. 80% of the SMART criteria) with a frequency of 31% each. A closer look at the individual criteria underlying the SMARTness concept revealed that **most indicators were time-bound and relevant**, while, in several cases, their measurability, achievability and specificity had considerable potential for improvement.

For the different sectors in which the TDA projects operated, various indicators were identified by the evaluation team that might be suitable as standard/exemplary outcome indicators. In the TVET sector, indicators measuring (1) the number of people using labour-market services were conclusive. For projects focused on access to education, indicators measuring (2) class attendance in rehabilitated schools and (3) number of trained teachers confirming improved teaching skills have proven to be successful. For WASH projects, indicators regarding (4) the number of households having access to drinking-water supply and/or sanitation, (5) the application of newly acquired knowledge on water quality and sustainable use, and (6) the increase in food-crop production quantities were measurable. And finally, in the agricultural sector, indicators measuring (7) agricultural production increases, (8) additional income through agricultural farming practices, (9) increased income from livestock and the cross-sectoral indicator of (10) social cohesion, i.e. measured as the (inter-)subjective perception of social tensions, were recommended.

The TDA projects under evaluation do appear to have made a **valuable contribution to planned goals at impact level.** A **strength** to be highlighted is that 14 out of 17 of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were addressed. The actual contribution to the goals through project implementation was also mostly confirmed. According to the CPE reports and interviews, **55 of the total 67 (i.e. 82%) overarching goals that were set were actually contributed to**. There was a particular focus on strengthening resilience – the overarching development objective of TDA. It is worth highlighting that **in all seven cases where activities targeted this objective, stakeholders confirmed that the projects significantly contributed to improved resilience of the target groups**. With regard to **weaknesses**, significant discrepancies between intended targets and actual contributions for the following seven overarching development goals were found: social cohesion, inclusion, SDG 5 gender equality, SDG 8 decent work and economic growth, SDG 11 sustainable cities and communities, SDG 12 responsible consumption and production, and SDG 13 climate action. A **further shortcoming** to be noted is that clear statements on contributions to overarching development goals can only be made if results-based monitoring of appropriate quality is available that also covers the impact level. Since this was not the case in all sample projects, some of the impact hypotheses could not be conclusively examined.

The projects recorded **several unplanned positive and a few non-intended negative effects**. The latter included the creation of frustration among different stakeholders, failure to take vulnerability criteria into account, poor communication and disagreements about the project approach, and the emergence of new conflicts. **On the negative side**, all projects bar two lacked systematic monitoring of unintended negative effects, while unintended positive effects were only systematically monitored in two projects. Consequently, **the listed non-intended effects can only be considered as anecdotal and non-exhaustive evidence** of aspects observed by stakeholders. Overall, **significant need for improvement** was noticed in this respect.

With regard to the success of the underlying projects, the **fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) identified two types of projects that were particularly successful**:

- projects with a (rather) high degree of adaptive project management that (rather) made use of (I)PCA and exhibited a (rather) high quality of results-based monitoring and systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring, but which, at the same time, did not possess rather SMART indicators, and
- projects with a (rather) high degree of adaptive project management and (rather) SMART indicators, which, at the same time, (rather) did not make use of the (I)PCA and did not display a high quality of results-based monitoring or systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring.

Further, the fsQCA identified one type of project that was comparatively less successful:

- a project with (rather) SMART indicators that (rather) did not make use of an (I)PCA and that (rather) lacked high-quality results-based monitoring and systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring, and was (rather) not adaptively managed.

Thus, the fsQCA confirmed the important role of **adaptive project management** for the success of the projects under evaluation. In addition, the **use of (I)PCA** and the **quality of results-based and conflict-sensitive monitoring** were crucial for a considerable number of (rather) successful projects. Nevertheless, SMART indicators may compensate in several cases for the lack of the aforementioned factors if projects are adaptively managed. However, SMART indicators alone do not make a project successful; the opposite is the case given the absence of the other factors.

Regarding non-intended negative effects, the fsQCA identified one type of project in which **non-intended negative effects were observed:**

- a project (rather) lacking adaptive management that (rather) made no use of (I)PCA and featured (rather) poor-quality results-based monitoring and whose conflict-sensitive monitoring was only partial, i.e. not systematic, or absent.

This result further underlines the importance of **adaptive project management**, **the use of (I)PCA** and **high-quality results-based and conflict-sensitive monitoring**.

Recommendations

Unless indicated otherwise, the following evidence-based recommendations concern project staff entrusted with the development and maintenance of the monitoring and evaluation system of projects. Recommendations for evaluation design include:

- ✓ The **availability of a formalised and high-quality results-based monitoring system** is essential for making informed statements about the effectiveness of activities and ensures resources are used to achieve clearly defined and demonstrable results. Critical components of sustaining a results-based monitoring system include monitoring of output und outcome indicators, periodic data collection and reliable baseline data. For outcome-level indicators, special care should be taken to ensure that they are formulated at outcome level and not at output level.
- ✓ The **availability of a formalised and high-quality conflict-sensitive monitoring system** plays a crucial role in project success, as it enables project staff to gain a detailed understanding of the context, the activity itself and the interaction between the two. It is an important tool for identifying risks at an early stage and reacting accordingly. For this purpose, all three areas must be covered: conflict and context monitoring, risk and security monitoring, and non-intended effects monitoring. The latter is important for identifying non-intended negative effects that may occur and counteracting them, if necessary.
- ✓ The **use of an (Integrated) Peace and Conflict Assessment ((I)PCA)** is highly recommended, especially in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. Even though all projects conducted an (I)PCA, its actual use was quite low. The (I)PCA should not only be conducted at the beginning of a project but

also, if possible, updated regularly throughout its implementation. Recommendations derived from the (I)PCA should be used as a guideline for future actions, in accordance with the results of the QCA.

- ✓ The **SMART framework** is a useful way to assess the quality of indicators. However, most TDA projects feature considerable weaknesses regarding the SMARTness of indicators. **The greatest room for improvement was found in terms of specificity, attainability and measurability.** In other words, areas of activity or numbers of sub-target groups need to be more clearly specified in indicators**.** Apart from that, the feasibility of the project objective in the envisaged timeframe under the given contextual conditions should be critically examined and adjusted accordingly. To enhance measurability, more specific criteria that measure progress towards the achievement of objectives are needed, as are reliable data sources.
- ✓ Moreover, **indicators should also be checked for their cultural fit.** From the interviews with project staff, it became clear that this was not always the case. To avoid time loss due to repeated change offers, focus group discussions with local experts are highly recommended by the evaluation team to gain an in-depth understanding of cultural circumstances; they also provide a good opportunity to back up the formulation of indicators.
- ✓ As is clear from this list of recommendations, having a consistent project M&E framework from the beginning is crucial. Consequently, a recommendation for GIZ is to include, when setting up the project team, the **position of monitoring and evaluation specialist with sufficient time resources and comprehensive qualifications**.

The diverse nature of the projects under evaluation meant it was not always possible to derive generally applicable project-related factors of success and failure. Nevertheless, a few tendencies of TDA projects did emerge across the CPEs. The following recommendations relate in particular to project management:

- ✓ When implementing a TDA project, **attention should be paid to specific managerial factors.** These include, but are not limited to, staff composition, i.e. the assurance of a sufficient quantity of highly **competent project staff**, **adaptive project management** and a **functional steering structure**. Roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined to avoid frustration, and there should be an on-site team leader and consistent leadership.
- ✓ There is broad consensus regarding the **importance of cooperation factors** in project implementation. TDA projects should ensure **constant dialogue with all stakeholders** to create a basis of trust. Moreover, activities should be **linked to local structures**, strengthen existing institutions and involve local staff through employment and training to ensure lasting changes. In addition, a **participatory approach should be followed**, whereby not only project partners but also beneficiaries are involved in planning and implementation. In this way, **ownership** is maximised, which, in turn, has a positive influence on project success. The **commitment of project staff** needs to be ensured.
- ✓ To avoid overlapping or causing unintended negative effects, **coordination with other development actors** in the field is highly recommended.
- ✓ Lastly, it would be beneficial to take **implementation concept-related factors** into account. These include, among others, **the application of the 'do no harm approach'. This requires the application of context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring.** Another related success factor is **sufficient funding and continued donor support**.

Evaluation Report

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1 Introduction

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH commissioned CEval GmbH to conduct an **evaluation synthesis** (QSA) of a sample of 10 central project evaluations (CPE) in the field of transitional development assistance (TDA). The overarching objective of the evaluation synthesis was to assess and generate evidence on a number of key issues focusing on a) general trends and challenges, and b) key factors for project success. For this purpose, results and conclusions from the evaluations and other selected strategy and concept papers were aggregated, qualitatively analysed and presented (Block A). Subsequently, new evidence on the influence of different factors on project success and on the absence of non-intended negative effects was generated via a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Block B).

In line with the **objective**, this report

- ensures the greatest possible methodological robustness of the results,
- provides an overview of general trends and challenges in TDA,
- summarises and aggregates the results and conclusions of individual CPEs in a structured manner,
- identifies factors of success and failure specific to TDA and the context in which TDA projects are implemented, and
- derives context-sensitive as well as TDA-related recommendations.

Under the terms of reference (ToR), the QSA provides answers to the following **key questions**:
Block A

- Which general trends and challenges in TDA can be identified or substantiated?
- Which success and failure factors of TDA projects can be identified and presented in summarised form? Which TDA-related and context-specific recommendations can be derived from this?
    - Which results hypotheses can be derived for specific sectors/areas/topics (e.g. **resilience,** social cohesion, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), education, law and administration/governance, etc.) and contexts?
- In which contexts are which impact hypotheses/approaches effective (recommendations)? To what extent are these specific to the field of TDA?
- How was the humanitarian-development-peace nexus addressed?
- Which indicators and what type were used at outcome level and how was their quality assessed?
- Which standard or exemplary indicators for relevant TDA projects and cross-cutting issues (especially **resilience** and social cohesion) can be derived?
- Which goals at impact level were explicitly and implicitly addressed (e.g. Sustainable Development Goals, **resilience**, social cohesion) and to what extent have the projects contributed to these goals?
- Which non-intended positive and negative effects/risks can be identified across projects and how can these be prevented or mitigated?

Block B

- What role do the independent variables ‘quality of (Integrated) Peace and Conflict Assessment ((I)PCA)’, ‘use of (I)PCA’, ‘quality of results-based monitoring’, ‘quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring’,’ state fragility[1]’, ‘indicator quality according to SMART criteria[2]’ and ‘type of indicator[3]’ play in terms of project success and the absence of non-intended negative effects?

The **structure** of the report is as follows: following this introduction, section 2 outlines the scope of the evaluation; section 3 describes the methodology; section 4 presents the core findings of the analyses

[1] This variable from Block A was included as an independent variable.

[2] ibid.

[3] ibid.

performed and the answers to the central research questions; section 5 contains conclusions; and section 6 features evidence-based recommendations, which can be used as orientation for future projects in the field of TDA. The annexes contain a raw-data matrix of the QCA, a list of the evaluation reports analysed, a list of the documents consulted, an assessment of data quality and the analysis grid for Blocks A and B.

2 Scope of the evaluation

This evaluation synthesis involved nine central project evaluations of TDA projects and one CPE of a regional EU co-financed project with similar priorities and in similar contexts, implemented in four countries (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'). The evaluation object therefore includes a number of different countries in various regions: South Sudan, Somalia (Somaliland), Haiti, Ukraine, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. The CPEs under evaluation cover four key fields of TDA action:[4] food and nutrition security, rebuilding basic infrastructure and services, disaster risk management, and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP)/peaceful and inclusive communities. In addition, they address cross-cutting issues, such as resilience and social cohesion. All of these TDA projects were implemented between April 2012 and April 2021. The duration of the projects varied from 26 to a maximum of 72 months. The data available in the 10 CPEs are mostly qualitative (mainly from interviews with relevant stakeholders and document analyses, including (quantified) monitoring data) and thus contribute to the generation of knowledge with all its methodological strengths and weaknesses. After a detailed examination of the overall data quality of the available CPE reports it can be confirmed that they contain **sufficient evidence to perform a corresponding synthesis** (for further information, see Annex IV). A list of the CPE reports analysed is provided in Annex II. To supplement the evaluation synthesis, interviews were conducted with selected project management staff.

[4] The projects cover more than these four (ideal and predefined) subject areas.

3 Methodology

This section discusses the methodological approach of the QSA, as well as its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the validity and reliability of the findings.

3.1 Evaluation approach

The QSA followed a **mixed-method approach**. To be more precise, the analysis underlying the QSA was divided into two blocks (A and B), which differ in terms of the methods applied. To answer the research questions from Block A, a qualitative *content* analysis was carried out, followed by a fuzzy-set qualitative *comparative* analysis (QCA) for Block B. For both analyses, the first step was to develop an analysis grid (see Annexes V and VI) into which the data from the document study were classified. This analysis grid was drafted based on the research questions from the ToR and in cooperation with GIZ. For an efficient coding, clearly defined and disjunctive categories were created. For this purpose, all reports were included in a three-stage qualitative content analysis using MaxQDA®. That is, the texts were searched for relevant fragments, which were then assigned to the appropriate categories (open coding). During the coding process, the category system was adapted inductively, similar to the approach used in the Grounded Theory Method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967/1998; Kuckartz, 2010; Mey & Mruck, 2007). After all data were coded, they were aggregated according to the category system and subjected to a second, axial coding. This means the aggregated results were scanned again for e.g. sectoral, regional, and other context-dependent similarities and differences. As a result, TDA-related and context-specific factors for project success or failure, such as standard/exemplary indicators and typical side effects, could be identified, as could overarching conclusions. Furthermore, the findings could be quantified and the strength of evidence identified by this QSA therefore assessed.

In order to answer the questions in Block B, firstly, exogenous variables, i.e. causal conditions, and endogenous variables, i.e. outcome variables, were defined. These were supplemented by one analytical category from Block A, i.e. indicator quality. Secondly, owing to the ordinal-scale nature of the variables, a fuzzy-set QCA (Rihoux & Ragin, 2007) was carried out. Once all indicators were agreed upon, the analysis commenced with the creation of a truth table based on all possible real-world combinations of characteristic values (configurations), to which the respective cases were then assigned. The extent to which the cases belong to the respective configurations of exogenous variables, i.e. their similarity to them, could then be used to explain the necessary conditions for achieving desired characteristic values of the endogenous variables. The configurations of exogenous variables that lead to the desired result, i.e. are most consistent, in most cases observed are usually called 'recipes'. These recipes ultimately describe which configurations 'most likely' lead to the desired result (in this case, project success and lack of non-intended negative effects). Finally, based on the influencing factors identified and the conclusions derived from them, recommendations were developed.

3.2 Strengths and weaknesses

A major strength of the study design was its primarily qualitative approach, which makes optimal use of the available data. Furthermore, the inductive development of the category system ensured that all relevant influencing factors were taken into account, which effectively avoided deductive fallacies (due to an incomplete analytical framework). Finally, the QCA enabled the development of a reliable explanatory framework for necessary and potentially sufficient conditions (or their combination) in the project contexts considered.

On the other hand, a crucial weakness of the design was its limited external statistical validity. In qualitative content analyses, the generalisation of findings requires strong assumptions about their transferability to other contexts. The same applies to QCAs whose results cannot be interpreted with inferential statistics. However, while it is not possible to calculate confidence intervals or probabilities of error, a QCA can nevertheless provide strong indications that the identified factors may be valid beyond the objects of observation if it is based on generally plausible and well-founded assumptions about causalities. As a configurational analysis approach, QCA goes further than a mere qualitative *content* analysis, as it allows not only the findings from individual cases to be aggregated but also the factors and their combinations that determine these findings (e.g. the project's success) in all 10 cases to be systematically identified. So, QCA increases the validity and reliability of the findings to the greatest extent possible. Given the number of cases (10–13), a statistical approach was not suitable for the analysis. **For the number of cases (10–13) involved, the methodological approach of the QCA provides the strongest possible evidence compared with other methodological designs.**

4 Findings

This section presents the findings of both the qualitative *content* analysis and the qualitative *comparative* analysis (QCA). In section 4.1, general trends and challenges that emerged across TDA projects are presented. Section 4.2 outlines success and failure factors specific to TDA projects. Section 4.3 goes into the results hypotheses in more detail, section 4.4 the indicators, section 4.5 the impact contributions and section 4.6 the unintended negative and positive effects. Finally, section 4.7 reveals the results of the QCA.

4.1 General trends and challenges in TDA

The first question that this evaluation synthesis aimed to answer is: which general trends and challenges in TDA can be identified or substantiated? In recent years, the nature of conflicts and crises worldwide has changed significantly. More and more countries are experiencing violent conflicts, which are also lasting longer and becoming much more intense

(Ecosoc, 2020; HIIK, 2021). Crises occur in different forms, such as violent conflicts, epidemics, natural disasters and financial and economic upheaval. They have myriad causes, are increasingly complex and fundamentally affect entire societies. Moreover, their consequences can spill over to other contexts/countries, in the form of large refugee movements, for example. As reported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019), the estimated number of displaced people worldwide currently exceeds 70 million. Against this backdrop, TDA, which is one of the crisis management instruments of BMZ – the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – plays an increasingly important role.

According to a generally accepted definition, TDA is a bridge between humanitarian assistance and longer-term international cooperation in volatile and often crisis-affected regions. In contrast to humanitarian assistance, TDA aims to help people and local structures that have been hit particularly hard by crises to overcome them and build their resilience[5], i.e. their capacity to withstand crises, over the medium and long terms. It focuses on processes of transformation towards peaceful and inclusive societal and state structures. In this way, TDA facilitates the transition to measures that promote sustainable development (BMZ, strategy paper 2/2020).

In line with this definition of TDA and following a detailed analysis of the 10 CPEs, it became evident that clear trends and challenges were able to be identified across projects. A **difficult security context** stood out as one such challenge. All CPEs evaluated described how the challenging security situation influenced project implementation and thus the achievement of the targeted outcome. Specified security risks were terrorist attacks (CPE 2; 9; 10); air strikes (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'; CPE 7, 'Health Iraq'); natural disasters, such as extreme droughts, catastrophic floods, human and animal epidemics, locust infestations, earthquakes and tropical cyclones (CPE 2; 3; 7); escalation of conflicts with the central government (CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq'; CPE 7, 'Health Iraq'); territorial conflicts (CPE 1; 2; 4); armed conflicts along ethno-linguistic lines and religious radicalism (CPE 2; 5; 7).

Another significant and prevalent challenge identified in the CPEs was **fragile statehood and legitimacy**. In eight out of 10 CPEs the project context was described as fragile (CPE 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 10). According to the Fragile State Index[6] produced by the Fund for Peace, the degree of fragility has to be considered as above average in all project countries, ranging from 69.0 (Ukraine) to 110.9 (Somalia). Somalia (Somaliland) has ranked first or second in the list of most fragile countries for the last 13 years. Given that Somaliland is less fragile than the rest of the country, this should be understood as an upper boundary estimate. Extremely high index values, i.e. high degrees of fragility, were also recorded for South Sudan (110.8), Haiti (97.7) and Iraq (95.9). Fragility goes hand in hand with **deficits in legitimacy**, that is, the rule of law, political participation by citizens and sovereignty are only possible/present to a very limited extent. Instead, systematic human rights violations and mass displacement are common.

Fragile statehood leads to a third major challenge indicated in the CPEs, which is how to address the needs of ***mobile target groups.*** All of the countries in the projects under evaluation were (or still are) experiencing an influx of refugees and/or a high number of internally displaced people (IDPs), and eight out of 10 of the projects (CPE 1; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10) addressed at least one of those as target group. As described in the CPEs, rejection of and discrimination against IDPs and refugees are frequently observed[7]. **The implementation of an activity specifically targeting vulnerable groups[8] of IDPs/refugees carries the risk of fostering conflict between refugees and host communities over scarce resources and basic services (CPE 2; 6; 8; 10). This important aspect needs to be taken**

[5] Ability of people and institutions – whether individuals, households, local communities or states – to withstand acute shocks or chronic stress caused by fragile situations, crises, violent conflict or extreme natural events, and to adapt and recover quickly, without compromising their medium- and longer-term prospects (BMZ strategy paper 6/2013e).

[6] Fragile States Index – https://fragilestatesindex.org

[7] For example, in CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan', it was mentioned that rejection of and discrimination against IDPs/refugees by local clans led to exclusion and increased the potential for conflict.

[8] Groups that experience a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion. These include national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, refugees, IDPs, disabled people, the elderly, women and children (UN, 2021; Eqavet, 2021).

into account, especially in the context of a conflict-sensitive approach. The political instability in the cases described above and the associated **dynamically changing contexts** result in a **need for agility in strategic and operational planning**. This highlights the importance of adaptive management, which was mentioned as a success factor for achieving the project objective in six out of 10 reports (see section 4.2).

The abovementioned trends and challenges have prompted extensive reflections on and within the international community. The increasing complexity and longer duration of humanitarian crises such as violent conflicts, displacement, extreme natural events or lack of economic prospects call for an integrated, efficient and sustainable approach to humanitarian assistance, development and peace in order to achieve better impacts in crisis contexts. The humanitarian-development-peace nexus (HDP nexus) aims to reduce the needs and risks of people affected by crises, promote prevention and strengthen the resilience of the people and local structures affected. The recommendations developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2019 are central to the work on the HDP nexus (OECD, 2019). Whether and to what extent the HDP nexus has been addressed in the CPEs under evaluation is discussed in more detail in section 4.3.

In addition to the CPEs themselves and project documents, project management staff were interviewed about the general trends and challenges emerging in TDA. **Key topics mentioned were the HDP nexus and sustainability.** One respondent stated that, for them, everything revolves around the HDP nexus. They believe the focus should be on the implementation of this approach in order to see real connections between the three areas, particularly in relation to peacebuilding activities, which are often neglected (Int_9). Another person said they had observed a strong focus on peacebuilding (peaceful, inclusive communities; civil conflict management) and that this should probably play a role in all TDA projects. Consequently, outcome indicators covering this area would be highly relevant. A resulting challenge, they added, was to bridge the gap between humanitarian assistance and development assistance (Int_15). A third interviewee also focused on the HDP nexus and how the way in which it is approached has changed significantly in recent years. According to the respondent, at the end of 2019, the focus was very much on the HDP nexus and 'connectedness', strong complementary implementation and synergies. Now, however, the respondent feels that more attention is being paid to differentiation, both from other projects and other humanitarian actors in the peacebuilding arena. This is making the work very strenuous at the moment, they concluded (Int_4[9]).

Other interviewees focused on the issue of sustainability. The balancing act between sustainability on the one hand and direct benefits for the target groups on the other was mentioned as a major challenge in the field of TDA. Donors might be focusing more on the development part, for example, but then the pendulum would suddenly swing back in the direction of humanitarian assistance if, say, an incident like the explosion of ammonium nitrate in Lebanon occurred. While such a swing would be understandable, it would make implementation more challenging. The same respondent pointed to the need to think carefully about how to incorporate capacity development into a TDA project. A new area of action in a new TDA strategy would be peacebuilding and reconstruction. In this context, the interviewee pointed out that peacebuilding takes a lot of time, which means that project timelines need to be adjusted accordingly (Int_1). This aspect was also mentioned by two other interviewees (Int_15, 3) who advocated placing more emphasis on sustainability, with one of them criticising financial outflow pressure as a classic problem, especially in the TDA sector (Int_3).

Three out of 11 interviewees[10] stated that they could not identify any trends, because they were not familiar with enough projects to be able to make a general statement (Int_13, 5, 12).

[9] This statement was also made in Int_2, 6, 8, 10, as the same person was interviewed for different projects.

[10] The number of interviewees cited here does not match the total number of interviews (i.e. 15) because some people were interviewed for multiple projects. In addition, the three staff interviewed regarding the Qudra project were counted as one interviewee.

4.2 Key factors of success/failure

In light of increasing challenges faced by TDA projects, close consideration of the following question was particularly important: which success and failure factors of TDA projects can be identified in the CPEs under evaluation? One goal of the synthesis was to aggregate evaluation findings across different projects in order to derive practical and context-specific recommendations. Based on the data provided by the 10 CPEs, a total of **40 success factors** was identified. Since success and failure factors are often complementary, and to avoid duplication, the evaluation team decided to focus on success factors and then reformulate the failure factors accordingly, where necessary. For example, instead of citing security risks as a failure factor, the complementary 'relatively stable security situation' was acknowledged as a success factor. Those factors can generally be separated into project-related and external factors. However, for a more differentiated consideration, the coded text passages were clustered and combined into four main categories*: general conditions* (mentioned in eight CPEs), *managerial factors* (13), *cooperation factors* (11), and *implementation concept-related factors* (8). The most frequently mentioned factors within the respective main categories are presented in Figures 1 to 4.

The first main category, **general conditions, comprises exclusively external factors**, i.e. those outside the projects' spheres of influence. Even though these factors could not be influenced by the projects, they are still mentioned for the sake of completeness. General conditions were divided into six sub-categories: *absence of regional intrastate conflicts, stable economy, stable security situation, stable political system, political conditions conducive to peaceful development* and *absence of (further) natural disasters.* Figure 1 illustrates the frequency with which each of the factors identified was mentioned. The blue bars represent observed cases. Theoretically, more cases may have occurred, but since no direct questions were asked about success and failure factors, only those that were explicitly mentioned in the CPEs can be listed.

The **absence of regional intrastate conflicts** was raised as a success factor by the majority of the CPEs (eight out of 10) (see Figure 1). The existence of a conflict, on the other hand, often resulted in restricted access to target groups and thus limited the implementation of activities. This aspect was stressed in CPE 5: *'The fact that the international personnel had to leave the country for several weeks during the referendum of independence in September 2017 was also a hindrance to implementation'* (CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq', p. 60). Seven CPEs emphasised a **relatively stable economy** as an important factor for project success (CPE 1; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10).

Figure 1: Success factors – general conditions



A financial crisis, by contrast, would lead to limited partner contributions and low motivation among unpaid public servants (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'). In addition, a high inflation rate would reduce the purchasing power of target groups, which, in turn, might affect the results and the project aims (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'). Another success factor frequently mentioned was the **relatively stable security situation** (CPE 2; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10). Conversely, the rather unstable security situation (as described in section 4.1) that prevailed in many of the project countries hampered project implementation. In addition, field visits were often more cost-intensive – for example, because of the need for a police escort (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia'; CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'). As a further consequence, international staff needed to be evacuated and thus had to support the projects remotely (CPE 1; 2; 5; 6; 7). Almost half of the CPEs (four out of 10) mentioned a functioning and **relatively stable political system** as helpful in terms of achieving the project outcomes. **Political conditions conducive to peaceful development**[11] was cited equally often as a success factor. The lack of such conditions could be identified in the Qudra programme conducted in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'), where the services of NGOs were restricted (e.g. in terms of implementing educational and psychosocial measures) or the degree of integration of refugees into social processes was hampered by policy requirements. Other political conditions that tended to hinder the achievement of project objectives were an **authoritarian political system**, meaning decisions were increasingly centralised, which then led to delays in programme implementation (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'), and **political pressure** to show quick results (CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq').

Finally, **absence of (further) natural disasters** was included in the list of *general conditions* that benefited the achievement of intended outputs and outcomes (CPE 2; 3; 6). The positive impact of the absence of (further) natural disasters was particularly stressed in Haiti: *'Moreover, the fact that it rained regularly and there were no hurricanes benefited the project'* (translated from French: *'D'ailleurs, le fait que les pluies soient venues régulièrement et qu'aucun ouragan n'ait soufflé, a bénéficié au projet. Le fait que le personnel des autorités locales n'ait pas changé pendant la période d'intervention est également un avantage',* CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti', p. 28). The occurrence of a natural disaster is a major constraint on implementation, as it shifts the focus to activities that mitigate the consequences of the disaster rather than the planned project activities (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq').

Figure 2: Success factors – managerial



[11] In Somaliland (Somalia), the inherently stable political conditions created by a government that is more concerned with the development of the country than its predecessor were mentioned. The support of UN organisations also contributed to stabilising general conditions (see CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia').

Against the background of these (un)favourable conditions, which are ubiquitous in TDA projects, the question arises as to how a project can nevertheless be successful. To answer that question, project-related success factors are examined in more detail in the following. The second main category, **managerial factors**, was divided into seven sub-categories: *staff composition, adaptive project management, functional steering structure, staff constancy, monitoring and evaluation system, absence of bureaucratic barriers* and *strategy development.* Figure 2 illustrates the frequency with which of each of the factors identified was mentioned.

Almost three quarters (seven out of 10) of the CPEs agreed that **staff composition** plays a crucial role in project success (CPE 2; 3; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9). Reference was made to aspects such as sufficient quantity (i.e. neither too many nor too few personnel), high level of competence (e.g. solid expertise in the relevant area, speaking at least one foreign language of the respective country, diplomatic skills)[12], composition (in terms of gender, professional background and country-specific knowledge) and team cohesion. **Adaptive project management,** i.e. the ability to deal flexibly with changes and challenges, was cited as another success factor in six CPEs (CPE 2; 4; 6; 7; 8; 10). Thus, both flexibility in respect of partner requests and ability to adapt to frequently changing general conditions appear to be necessary in order to enable quick responses, generate new and additional outputs, and achieve the targeted effects. To ensure clear prioritisation in these decision-making processes a **functional steering structure that establishes the framework for cooperation with partners and the project team** is essential (CPE 1; 2; 6; 10). Many stakeholders complained about insufficient communication and transparency, and unclear roles and responsibilities. This underlines the importance of well-developed coordination structures, an on-site team leader and consistent leadership. Another success factor, identified in three of the reports under evaluation, was **staff constancy**, with regard to both the project team and the project partners. High staff turnover means new staff members are unfamiliar with the previous steps and results of the project (CPE 2; 3; 10), as noted in CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti': '*The fact that the local authority staff did not change during the intervention period is also an advantage'* (translated from French: *'Le fait que le personnel des autorités locales n'ait pas changé pendant la période d'intervention est également un avantage',* CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti', p.28). A further *managerial factor*, referred to in three CPEs, was the existence of a **robust M&E system** to enable the collection of reliable data (CPE 3; 4; 5). Its importance lies in monitoring the project's performance as well as its progress, and enabling adjustments to be made if the project is not progressing as planned. Furthermore, it offers the possibility to assess the satisfaction levels of the stakeholders involved. The fact is, however, that **several of the CPEs had no or a weak M&E system**. In CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti', for example, it was reported that *'the project did not apply any M&E system'* (translated from French: *'Le projet n'a appliqué aucun système de S&E*' (CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti', p. 15); *'indicators were developed during the project planning and targets were added later, regardless of the sources actually available'* (translated from French: *'Des indicateurs ont été développés lors de la planification du projet et des cibles ont été ajoutées plus tard, indépendamment des ressources réellement disponibles',* CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti', p. 29); and *'[there is a] general lack of baseline data […]'* (CPE 4, 'Emergency Ukraine', p. 56). Two out of 10 CPEs mentioned the **absence of bureaucratic barriers** as a decisive positive influencing variable (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'; CPE 9, 'Education, Turkey'). GIZ internal administrative and procurement processes, as well as general rules on how to spend the money in TDA, would significantly reduce the flexibility of the projects and hamper the necessary rapid response. Finally, two reports (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'; CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia') highlighted the significance of a **strategy development** process that pursues the aim of specifying implementation strategies. This includes a review of the design, a stakeholder analysis to understand the roles and interests of key players, a deep context analysis and the development of a theory of change (ToC) (including verification of the plausibility and measurability of the result hypothesis and indicators).

[12] Since the reports did not provide sufficient information in this regard, the examples given were supplemented by the information obtained from the interviews (Int_7, 13).

Other success factors in the managerial factors category that were explicitly mentioned by just one CPE each were as follows: definition of an **exit strategy** in order to ensure durability of results and impact (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey'); **financing instruments** that guarantee effective spending of large amounts of money (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'); the existence of a **functional office** in the target region (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia'); **support by UN organisations**, which contributes to stabilising general conditions (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia'); availability of a **security and risk management system** (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'); and, finally, the **involvement of experts** in training development (CPE 7; 'Health Iraq').

The third main category, **cooperation factors**, was divided into eight sub-categories: *constant dialogue and close cooperation with stakeholders, linking of the activity to local structures, participatory approach, ownership, commitment, coordination with other development actors, transparency* and *timely exchange*. Figure 3 illustrates the frequency with which each of the factors identified was mentioned. The only success factor that was unanimously mentioned by all CPEs (10 out of 10) was **constant dialogue and close cooperation with stakeholders.** Good communication has been shown to be crucial for the development of trusting relationships between all stakeholders involved, including target groups. As was evident from the negative example of Haiti, insufficient communication with beneficiaries and communities can have serious consequences: According to interviewees, GIZ had compiled a list of tanks to be built/rehabilitated. Based on this list, local authorities communicated the number of tanks to their electorates. However, as the actual number of tanks was lower than originally planned, the local authorities were accused of lying (CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti').

A second important factor in the *cooperation* category is **linking the activity to local structures** (CPE 1; 2; 3; 4; 6; 7; 10). The projects analysed considered the use of local resources as beneficial, whether it was the mere fact of the existence of a system *('it was conducive to the project's success that the Kurdistan region of Iraq had a functional public health system before the humanitarian and financial crises started*', CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 55), the strengthening of existing institutions and structures (CPE 2; 3; 4; 10) or the employment and training of local staff to ensure long-term implementation (CPE 1; 3; 6; 10). Linked to this, a **participatory approach**, i.e. joint planning and implementation with project partners, was explicitly recommended by seven out of 10 CPEs (CPE 1; 2; 4; 6; 7; 8; 10). Through this approach, collaboration between governmental, non-governmental and private-sector actors can be fostered. It can even mean including beneficiaries in the decision-making process during project implementation at the local level. In Somalia (Somaliland) (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia', p. 63), it was stressed that '*[i]t is not only a matter of more inclusion of the state partners but how they can be made the driving force behind the activity.*

Figure 3: Success factors – cooperation



Joint analysis of line ministries' priorities in terms of relevance, achievability and impact, and subsequent support for implementation' are listed as recommendations. One of the challenges was reaching an agreement between the project and the partners regarding the project approach, partner structure and spending (CPE 2; 5; 7). A positive consequence of the participatory approach is the development of ownership, which leads to the next success factor. **Ownership** was identified as a key success factor by half the CPEs (CPE 3; 6; 8; 9; 10). **Commitment** of project staff and arising from close cooperation between authorities, partners and target groups, is another important aspect to be considered (CPE 4; 6; 7; 9; 10). As highlighted in CPE 7, '*[p]artner contributions are indispensable for project success'* (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 34). Beyond the contributions of project partners, the need for **coordination with other development actors**[13] active in the same region was highlighted in five out of 10 CPEs, to avoid overlapping or causing unintended negative impacts (CPE 1; 2; 4; 5; 10). For the various actors to cooperate successfully, a high degree of **transparency** is necessary (CPE 5; 6; 9; 10), encompassing clear communication with partners about the strategy, scope and limitations of the project. This generates trust and avoids frustration. Related to this and yet worthy of being considered separately as a success factor is **timely exchange** between the commissioning party, partners and GIZ (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'; CPE 7, 'Health Iraq'). This is particularly relevant in the context of providing emergency assistance. But the time factor also plays a major role in other types of projects. **Sufficient time for planning** the activity was identified as crucial in several CPEs.

Other success factors in the cooperation category that were mentioned by just one CPE each were the **engagement of government with local communities** to achieve systematic intercommunal dialogue (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional') and **peer-to-peer learning.** The latter was implemented in Somalia (Somaliland), for example**,** through exposure visits to neighbouring countries, such as Ethiopia or Kenya, and within the country for ministry staff (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia').

The fourth main category, **implementation concept-related factors**, was divided into three sub-categories: *conflict sensitivity/'do no harm' approach, financial resources* and *needs-based approach.* Figure 4 illustrates the frequency with which each of the factors identified was mentioned.

Figure 4: Success factors relating to the implementation concept



Projects' conflict sensitivity or the **'do no harm' approach** (Anderson, 1999) was mentioned in eight out of 10 CPEs (CPE 1; 2; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10). A central component is therefore the analysis of potential non-intended negative effects and potential risks for staff, partners and target groups. This includes taking local traditions and norms into account when planning and implementing an activity. In Turkey (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey'), for example, particular importance was attached to the inclusion of Syrian refugees but also of the host community as beneficiaries of the activity, so as not to exacerbate existing conflicts between the two groups. The timely availability of **sufficient financial resources and continued donor support** (CPE 1; 4; 6; 7; 9) is another factor. If these are not available, resulting in delayed payment for project activities, the enthusiasm of volunteers and employees might drop, as acknowledged in the project in Turkey (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey'). Finally, in four out of 10 cases, the **needs-based approach** was praised as a success factor (CPE 2; 5; 6; 7). This approach pursues the goal of demand-oriented project planning and implementation to respond to the needs of the partners and (indirect) target groups.

Other success factors relating to the implementation concept that were mentioned by just one CPE each were as follows: implementation of a 'linking relief, rehabilitation and development' **(LRRD) approach**[14],

[13] Coordination with other development actors was highlighted as necessary to avoid overlaps with the activities of other donors/organisations (e.g. CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'). In the interviews, collaboration with other development actors was highlighted as particularly important for complementarity. Exchanges would make it possible to gain an overview of other actors already working in the specific area, to build on comparative advantages and to follow on from what others have already achieved (Int_9).

[14] 'The concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) has been on the international agenda for decades. The

i.e. the precursor of the HDP nexus (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'); availability of trained **project facilitators** in the community, who helped farmers understand and apply improved climate change-adapted agricultural practices and the concept of vegetable production (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'); use of **digital solutions** (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'); and **accessibility** of project sites (CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti'). Moreover, **high political visibility**, with frequent visits by German politicians, which added pressure to produce tangible results and raise awareness of the needs of the target groups, was emphasised as a success factor (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq').

4.3 Proof of hypotheses at outcome and impact levels

The CPEs under evaluation relate to six thematic areas: Agriculture; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH); Disaster Risk Management; Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET); Education; and Health. Depending on the sector/thematic area, different causal assumptions at outcome and impact levels were able to be identified.

In order to answer the question '*in which contexts are which impact hypotheses/approaches effective?'*, the evaluation team reformulated it as follows: '*In which contexts can which results hypotheses/impact hypotheses be confirmed?'* To measure the causal links between project activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts, the intention was to review three results hypotheses (outcomes) and three impact hypotheses from the theory of change of each CPE (for CPE 10, 'Qudra regional', four impact hypotheses were reviewed, making a total of 61 hypotheses). Overall, 43 hypotheses could be identified, while, for 18 potential hypotheses, no information was available in the CPE.[15]

Hypotheses at outcome level in projects in the agricultural sector (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'; CPE 2 'Agriculture Somalia') refer to the continued application of theoretical knowledge by beneficiaries (e.g. agropastoral and pastoral livestock farmers, milk producers) gained through training in agricultural practices adapted to climate change, such as livestock management, fodder production and animal health. At impact level, it is assumed that the improved livestock farming and agriculture practices would lead to improved food and nutrition security all year round and thus to greater resilience in the long term.

At outcome level, the hypotheses of projects in the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector (CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti'; CPE 6 'WASH Iraq') mainly mention the increased number of cisterns, which significantly improved the availability of safe water, thereby contributing to the fundamental human need of access to water. In addition, shorter distances to the tanks led to time and financial savings at household level. A second component was aimed more at the long-term maintenance of the measure, by increasing partners' capacity to maintain the water supply themselves. At impact level, increased resilience through improved overall health, reduced workloads for women and children, and saved resources were highlighted. The extra time gained was able to be devoted to socio-cultural activities, which, in turn, had the potential to enhance resilience.

Regarding disaster risk management, covered in only one of the CPEs analysed (CPE 4, 'Emergency Ukraine'), output/outcome-level hypotheses all refer to the strengthening of the emergency management system and of partner structures. This would lead to reduced death tolls in emergencies and accidents, enhanced accountability and acceptance of state emergency services, and a stronger civil society at impact level.

The hypotheses formulated in the TVET sector (CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq'; CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey') required an examination of whether increased employability of trained participants and the increased use of the mobile job centres – and thus, better knowledge about employment opportunities – led to an increase in (self-) employment among women and men. At

model was conceived as a response to the funding gap that was identified between relief operations and longer-term development operations following disasters' (European Parliament, 2012: p. 1).

[15] For CPE 1 and CPE 5, no hypotheses could be identified from the reports under evaluation, i.e. six hypotheses were missing – three at outcome level and three at impact level. In several CPEs, fewer than three hypotheses at outcome level and three at impact level were available, i.e. overall, 12 hypotheses were missing. Thus, instead of, theoretically, 61 hypotheses, i.e. six per CPE for 10 CPEs plus one additional impact hypothesis for CPE 10, only 43 hypotheses were available.

impact level, it was also examined whether the (self-)employment was financially successful and the employment created reliable salary payments, leading to more stable households and, ultimately, better living conditions for the people concerned.

In the education sector (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey'), hypotheses at outcome level involved capacity development of teachers, especially with regard to the integration of refugee children and the creation of environments that allowed teachers to apply adapted approaches. Both would lead to improved conditions for access to education and a higher quality of teaching. An improved learning environment with equal opportunities, regardless of students' origin, and facilitated intercultural dialogue would, in turn, foster social cohesion at impact level.

In a second step, it was assessed whether the evidence provided by the CPEs confirmed or disapproved the respective hypotheses (see Annex III). The confirmation of the impact hypotheses strongly depended on the confirmation of the related results hypotheses. Only if these were confirmed were the results at impact level plausible. Otherwise, the logic of the ToC was already compromised at a lower level. Overall, findings were extremely positive: based on the assessments presented in the CPEs, 29 out of 43 hypotheses could be confirmed and 10 hypotheses could be partly confirmed. Owing to lack of evidence, three hypotheses were neither confirmed nor disproved and only one hypothesis could not be confirmed. The latter was based on the assumption that improved pedagogical skills of staff and better teaching equipment would allow TVET pilot schools to adapt their training offer to the refugee situation, leading to increased enrolment of Syrian and Turkish students at these schools. For various reasons, this hypothesis could not be confirmed (for more details, see Annex II – CPE 8, outcome-level hypothesis 2). Assessments presented by the CPE seemed largely plausible to the evaluation team; however, in several cases, the evaluation team determined that the evidence was too weak to fully confirm the hypotheses. The review yielded the following results: confirmation of 23 out of 43 hypotheses (vs 29 by CPEs) and part-confirmation of 14 hypotheses (vs 10 by CPEs), while five hypotheses (vs three by CPEs) could be neither confirmed nor disapproved, given data limitations. Close consideration of all the hypotheses analysed revealed no systematic patterns between the context, i.e. sector/thematic area, to which the hypothesis relates and project success.

HDP nexus

The **humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus**, or HDP Nexus, is an approach that envisages greater coordination and cooperation between humanitarian action, development and peacebuilding. In the 1980s, debates began on how to overcome the limited coordination of aid measures in the three areas. These resulted in approaches such as *LRRD*, which aims to bridge the humanitarian-development divide. However, the numerous approaches have, so far, failed to provide a continuous, reliable transition between crisis response and development work (Hövelmann, 2020). Owing to the rapid increase in conflicts and crises worldwide, the pressure to achieve better results through more integrated, effective and efficient ways of working is high (Buchanan-Smith & Maxwell, 1994; Howe, 2019). The aim of this section is to examine whether and to what extent the TDA projects under evaluation sought to closely coordinate the three areas. A review of the CPEs revealed that none of the projects explicitly addressed the HDP nexus. For a more differentiated analysis, project management staff were asked for an assessment of their respective projects in that regard. According to the information obtained from the interviews, in six out of 13 projects the HDP nexus did not play a role (CPE 1; 3; 4; 7; 8; 9). The project management teams from the remaining seven projects confirmed that the HDP nexus was directly or indirectly addressed and provided more details (Int_9, 8, 1, 14, 10, 11). In Northern Iraq (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'), the approach was addressed through the construction of urgently needed water boreholes in refugee camps *(humanitarian action)* in combination with the rehabilitation of an extensive water structure together with local water authorities *(sustainable development)* and conflict prevention for the benefit of all groups *(peacebuilding)* (Int_9, 8). Even though the fulfilment of the peacebuilding component is questionable[16], at least the double nexus was clearly

[16] As there is no clear definition of what coverage of the peacebuilding part in the HDP nexus looks like, no statement

addressed in this case. In the Qudra programme (CPE 10), which was implemented in Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the HDP nexus was also taken into account, according to the interviewees (Int_1). However, upon further inquiry, no activity in the humanitarian field or cooperation with humanitarian actors were identified. As in CPE 6, 'WASH, Iraq', peacebuilding measures were said to have been covered by the fact that all groups would benefit equally from the activity (Int_1). Nevertheless, owing to the lack of humanitarian activities, the HDP nexus would not be considered to have been addressed in this case. In Somalia (Somaliland) (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia'), the HDP nexus was addressed indirectly. In the context of the severe drought that occurred during the project period, activities were carried out that could, to some extent, be considered as humanitarian work. For example, emergency feeding was carried out to prevent livestock herds from dying and the numbers of goats and sheep were increased through a restocking programme (Int_14). However, there was no measure included that would cover the peace component, which leads to the conclusion that, in this case, the double rather than HDP nexus was addressed. In another project, in Northern Iraq (CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq'), the view was expressed that TDA is in itself a nexus approach. The interviewee made reference to joint coordination with other actors. According to their observations, there had been agreements with other actors, but no joint implementation of projects (Int_11). Regarding the project's coverage of the three areas, the following information was provided: the activities in the humanitarian area would have resulted from spontaneous needs that arose in the field. For example, when the refugee camp was flooded in bad weather, floor tiles were financed out of necessity, even though this was not part of the planned project (Int_10)[17]. A social-cohesion project component, i.e. bringing different groups together in community centres, would have covered the peacebuilding part, but implementation of this component had not been possible owing to local regulations. There was no desire to bring people living in camps together with people living outside (Int_11). When considering the measures actually implemented, it must be assumed that the double and not the HDP nexus was addressed in this case.

Based on the information from the CPEs and interviews, the evaluators conclude that the HDP nexus was not fully addressed by any of the projects – a finding that is line with the assessment of the CPEs. In three of 13 cases, it was partially addressed (double nexus) and in all remaining cases, i.e. 10, the HDP nexus was not addressed at all. The main reason given for not addressing this concept was that it was not as well known at the time of project planning. Accordingly, there is great potential for optimising future TDA projects by considering the three interrelated areas during planning and implementation. However, three interviewees also stressed that it was a clear requirement of BMZ to separate international cooperation activities from humanitarian assistance activities, and that care had been taken to ensure that there was a clear distinction from humanitarian actors (Int_1, 10, 11). To conclude, the requirements for the HDP nexus go far beyond the project activities of the TDA projects under review. According to its guidelines, BMZ does not seek greater cooperation between these three areas.

4.4 Indicators

Quality assessment of indicators

An important pillar of successful projects is well-defined indicators to channel activities towards envisaged objectives at output and outcome levels. The QSA is guided by two questions in this regard: (i) '*Which indicators and what type were used at outcome level and, where appropriate, at output level, and how was their quality (in terms of SMART criteria) assessed?'* and (ii) '*Which standard or exemplary indicators for relevant TDA projects and cross-cutting issues (especially resilience and social cohesion) can be derived?'*

An assessment of the agility, narrowness and broadness of indicators was not conducted in accordance with GIZ as, to the best of the evaluation

can be made in this regard.

[17] The other interviewee from the same project stated that there had been no humanitarian activities at all (Int_11).

team's knowledge, evaluation research did not provide a broadly acknowledged definition of the underlying concepts.

Table 1 lists outcome indicators for the assessed CPEs. Whenever outcome indicators were not clearly presented by the CPE, clarification was sought via expert interviews with project management staff. A detailed analysis of output indicators was not conducted. Random checks revealed that strong outcome indicators are a valid proxy for strong output indicators; however, weak outcome indicators do not necessarily correspond to weak output indicators. This is backed up by theoretical considerations, as setting out SMART indicators at output level, where expected results are more tangible, is much easier than equally strong indicators at outcome level. Nevertheless, further analysis was not expected to add value to this QSA.

The analysis of outcome indicators revealed a mixed picture: all indicators reported in CPE 1 ('Agriculture South Sudan'), CPE 5 ('TVET Iraq') and CPE 7 ('Health Iraq') were judged as rather broad, while all indicators in CPE 2 ('Agriculture Somalia') were judged as rather narrow. Indicators reported in CPE 3 ('WASH Haiti'), CPE 6 ('WASH Iraq'), CPE 4 ('Emergency Ukraine'), CPE 8 ('TVET Turkey'), CPE 9 ('Education Turkey') and CPE 10 ('Qudra regional') varied, with some being assessed as rather broad, others as rather narrow. A look at the different areas of activity did not reveal any clear pattern: indicators in the fields of agriculture, WASH, Education and TVET did not follow a clear structure, i.e. being either rather broad or rather narrow. **Only indicators relating to social cohesion seemed to be broad.**

Table 1: Summary of outcome indicator assessment

CPE	Outcome indicator	Specific	Measurable[18]	Attainable[19]	Relevant	Time-bound
1	***The resilience of selected households in Western Bahr el Ghazal* (South Sudan) *is improved and livelihoods are stabilised through the efficient use of existing natural resources and measures for climate-change adaptation.***					
1.1	In 800 households, improved, resource-efficient agricultural production methods are implemented for the sustainable management of natural resources.	N	N	Y	Y	Y
1.2	400 households generate 10% additional income through the establishment of resource-conserving agricultural farming practices.	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
1.3	100 households (30% of which are headed by women) have diversified and increased their income by 10% through small-scale enterprises.	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
2	***The livelihoods of the supported population are improved and resilience is enhanced.***					
2.1	40% of 3,500 pastoralists and agro-pastoralists (men, women and young people) have increased their income from livestock farming by 20%.	Y	N	N[20]	Y	Y
2.2	40% of 400 milk producers and 30% of 80 local female traders have increased their income by 20% by using improved practices, such as better milk hygiene and milk cooling.	Y	N	N	Y	Y
2.3	60% of 500 selected agro-pastoral households, 10% of them headed by women, have increased their production and consumption of cereals, fruit, vegetables and/or fodder crops.	N	N	N	Y	Y
2.4	80% of 4,000 selected agro-pastoral and pastoral households, 10% of them headed by women, have increased access to water.	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
3	***The resilience of the rural population living in south-eastern Haiti to***					

[18] All of the indicators listed are, in principle, measurable. Thus, no arbitrary formulation has been chosen. However, the decisive factor for the present evaluation was whether the indicator is reliably measurable under the country-specific contextual conditions and the data sources used.

[19] The assessment of whether an indicator is attainable or not requires contextual knowledge, which goes beyond the discussion provided in the CPEs. Hence, the assessment is primarily based on insights gained from the interviews with project management staff.

[20] The indicators of this project are generally considered attainable, but not in the given time frame or circumstances (drought, delayed project start due to fragility, etc.).

	recurrent droughts is being strengthened. (La résilience de la population rurale vivant dans le Sud-Est d'Haïti face aux périodes de sécheresse récurrentes est renforcée.)					
3.1	The water supply to the 2,000 households supported is extended for 30 days during the periods of drought.	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
3.2	In the 2,000 households supported, the average time spent (four hours) by women and children fetching water during droughts has decreased by 25%.	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
3.3	60% of the 5,200 beneficiaries (50% of whom are women) demonstrate, for example, that they are applying the knowledge acquired to guarantee water quality and to use this resource in a sustainable way.	N	N	Y	Y	Y
3.4	300 farmers have increased their production of food crops per hectare by an average of 20%.	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
4	***Capacity of the Ukrainian emergency management system is strengthened***					
4.1	A concept for forward-looking and integrated emergency management that is developed in a participatory manner and available to central actors at national level.	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
4.2	The number of persons killed in fire incidents and in disasters in Ukraine (rescue teams and population) dropped by 15% for the five-year period 2015–2019 in comparison with the five-year period 2010–2015.	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
4.3	The capital Kyiv and two selected municipalities a) have emergency management services, which comply with standards to be developed at international or national levels, and b) cooperate with existing DSNS (State emergency service) structures.	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	***IDPs, refugees and the population in host communities have improved access to education, vocational training and earning opportunities***					
5.1	School education is available to 30,000 children (IDPs, refugees, returnees from Germany and other countries, and population in host communities).	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
5.2	Qualifications of relevance to the labour market have been obtained by 7,400 people (20% of whom are women), such as basic training for employment, occupational qualifications and training in starting a business.	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
5.3	100 micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) have been supported by the project (e.g. business start-ups, grants, loans).	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
6	***In Dohuk Governorate* (Iraq), *the ability to maintain the drinking-water supply and sanitation for refugees, IDPs and host communities is enhanced.***					
6.1	In Dohuk Governorate, 210,000 inhabitants (local residents, IDPs and refugees) have access to a drinking-water supply and/or sanitation that meet the minimum standards defined by the Board for Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA).	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6.2	In the five IDP and refugee camps in the sub-district of Faida (Domiz I and II, Kabarto I and II, and Shariya), 350 men and 20 women of the approximately 93,000 refugees and IDPs benefit from labour-intensive construction measures in the area of water supply and sanitation.	Y	Y	Y	N	Y
6.3	Different population development scenarios are taken into account in the strategy drawn up by BRHA for assistance in water supply and sanitation for IDPs and refugees.	N	Y	Y	N	Y
6.4	Competent authorities have developed an option to redesign the institutional structure of the water sector in Dohuk Governorate.	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
7	***Medical and psychosocial care for IDPs, refugees and the local population in the host areas in Dohuk Province* (Iraq) *have improved.***					
7.1	250 births in four basic health services centres (primary healthcare centres – PHCCs) offering obstetric care were medically supervised.	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
7.2	The emergency department at the Azadi Teaching Hospital (ATH) in Dohuk has entered into operation.	N	Y	N	Y	Y
7.3	130,000 people in Dohuk Province (50% of them women) receive psychosocial support from suitably trained medical experts.	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
8	***The access of Syrian refugees and members of the host community to selected TVET and adapted labour-market services is improved.***					
8.1	8,000 people (Syrian refugees and population of refugee-hosting communities), 30% of them women, use new or adapted labour-market services by June 2019	N	N	Y	Y	Y
8.2	500 Syrian refugees, 30% of them women, attend regular courses at technical high schools and vocational education centres in May 2019.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
8.3	1,000 people (Syrian refugees and members of refugee-hosting communities), 30% of them women, participated in measures to promote social cohesion and community initiatives (e.g. sports tournaments, theatre, cultural events).	N	Y	Y	N	Y

9	***Conditions are in place that enable Syrian and Turkish children and young people to access common educational services and activities that foster social cohesion in seven selected provinces.***					
9.1	22,500 Syrian and Turkish children and young people in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis and Hatay attend classes in schools rehabilitated according to MoNE (Ministry of National Education) standards.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9.2	70% of the 600 trained teachers (of whom 40% are female) confirm on a scale of 1–3 that their skills in teaching mixed groups of Syrian and Turkish students have increased to 2 or 3.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
9.3	25,000 Syrian and Turkish children and young people participated in extracurricular educational and recreational activities.	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
10	***The general conditions for refugees and host communities in the neighbouring countries of Syria and Iraq have improved.***					
	Module 1 Jordan:					
10.1	JOI 1.1: 40 construction measures implemented at 25 to 40 schools.	N	Y	N	Y	Y
10.2	JOI 1.2: 22,500 to 36,000 schoolchildren (Syrian/Jordanian, about 52% of them girls) benefit from improved school conditions.	N	N	N	Y	Y
10.3	JOI 1.3: A sample of 40 staff (at schools, directorates and the Ministry of Education) reports that conditions at 15 schools and human-resources capacity have improved by 3 points on a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1 meaning conditions are very poor and 10 meaning conditions are excellent).	N	Y	N	Y	Y
	Module 1 Lebanon:					
10.4	LOI 1.1: A sample of staff at the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) Project Management Unit (PMU), as well as teachers and students, report that conditions at 30 schools have improved by 3 points on a scale from 1 to 10 (with 1 meaning conditions are very poor and 10 meaning conditions are excellent).	N	Y	N	Y	Y
10.5	LOI 1.2: At least 30 plans for rehabilitation measures have been implemented.	N	Y	N	Y	Y
10.6	LOI 1.3: Sports and other activities for Syrian refugees and host communities from 10 to 15 schools are offered on a regular (at least weekly) basis.	N	Y	N	Y	Y
	Module 1 Turkey:					
10.7	TOI 1.1: 15,000 Syrian and Turkish students (50% male, 50% female, with a special focus on the neediest, including children with special needs) benefit from rehabilitation works at 15 public schools by the end of 2018.	N	N	N	Y	Y
	Module 2 Jordan:					
10.8	JOI 2.1: Young Syrians and Jordanians have been trained in at least three occupational fields; 5,000 young vulnerable Jordanian and Syrian students (80% young people, of whom 40% are female) are enrolled in at least 10 training centres; 1,000 (of the total 5,000) combine the skills training with practical work (via short-term employment and/or an apprenticeship).	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Module 2 Lebanon:					
10.9	LOI 2.1: Knowledge about available and suitable skills training opportunities among Syrian refugees and host communities has improved through public informational sessions by 3 points (on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 meaning no knowledge and 10 meaning fully aware of available training opportunities, certified and non-certified).	N	N	N	Y	Y
10.10	LOI 2.2: Skills development measures are implemented in at least two sectors, in areas that are hosting a large number of refugees.	N	Y	N	Y	Y
10.11	LOI 2.3: 2,000 students (50% female, including Syrian refugees) are enrolled at training institutions in Lebanon (public, private and non-profitable institutes).	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
	Module 2 Turkey:					
10.12	TOI 2.1: Number of Syrian refugees (aged 15–34) who have completed skills training at Public Education Centres (PECs) has increased by 35% by the project end (50% of the total are female).	Y	N	N	Y	Y
10.13	TOI 2.2: 80% of participants in PEC skills training (members of host communities and refugees) confirm that their newly acquired skills will help them pursue economic opportunities and/or improve their livelihoods.	N	N	N	N	Y
	Module 3 Jordan:					
10.14	JOI 3.1: A sample of Syrian refugees and Jordanians from the targeted areas report that tensions have decreased by 3 points on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 meaning tensions are very low and 10 meaning tensions are very high).	N	N	N	Y	Y
	Module 3 Lebanon:					
10.15	LOI 3.1: 66,620 beneficiaries have access to child protection, protection and information services.	N	N	N	Y	Y
10.16	LOI 3.2: 60% of Syrian refugees and Lebanese beneficiaries report that their well-being has increased.	N	Y	N	Y	Y
10.17	LOI 3.3: A sample of Syrian and Lebanese people from the targeted areas	N	N	N	Y	Y

	report that tensions have decreased by 3 points on a scale from 1 to 10.					
	Module 3 Turkey:					
10.18	TOI 3.1: 4,500 Turkish and Syrian participants (at least 25% female) have attended one out of 120 non-formal, local, socio-cultural activities/training sessions (including sports and media) organised by trained young people in the surroundings of three GIZ bilaterally supported MSC projects.	Y	N	N	Y	Y
10.19	TOI 3.2: 13,700 Syrians and host community members (at least 25% female) have participated in one non-formal, local, socio-cultural activity organised in one Youth Development Centre, one mobile unit and at least three institutions, such as PECs.	Y	N	N	Y	Y
10.20	TOI 3.3: A sample of Syrians and host-community members from the targeted areas report that tensions have decreased by 3 points on a scale from 1 to 10 (EF) (1 meaning tensions are very low and 10 meaning tensions are very high).	N	N	N	Y	Y
	Module 4 Jordan:					
10.21	JOI 4.1: The revenue of the municipalities of Mafraq, Sarhan and Ramtha has increased by 10%, while electricity costs have been reduced by 25%, and local population participation in the formulation of management modules of municipal public services in the participating municipalities has increased by 25%.	N	N	N	Y	Y
	Module 4 Iraq:					
10.22	IOI 4.1: Partner-driven Governorate Development Facilities (EUR 3,6 million) finance up to 36 small-scale community-based projects in the Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah governorates, benefiting more than 50,000 refugees, IDPs and members of the local communities (per governorate, at least 30% of direct beneficiaries are women) (GIZ).	N	N	Y	Y	Y
10.23	IOI 4.2: Community-based activities in the area of livelihood and economic opportunities will benefit 1,560 households (7,800 individuals) of host communities, IDPs and refugees.	N	Y	N	Y	Y
10.24	IOI 4.3: Local governmental and non-governmental organisations provide market-oriented vocational education, employment promotion and small business start-up support to facilitate access to and (re-)integration into the local labour market for 1,200 returning and residing individuals in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (GIZ).	N	N	Y	Y	Y

Note: Assessment of outcome indicators as defined by projects: Y=Yes, N=No.

Moreover, the table provides a summary of the assessment of the degree to which the outcome indicators are SMART. Again, the analysis reveals a mixed picture, with unclear patterns. In 10 CPEs, 54 outcome indicators were reported. Although not mentioned in every case, contextual analysis provides evidence that all indicators are related to the end of project. Taking this into account, the indicators **perform best with respect to being time-bound**. Slightly more than a third of the indicators, i.e. **19 out of 54, are considered specific**. Roughly half, **28 out of 54, seem measurable**. The counter-intuitive finding that more indicators are measurable than specific can be explained by the fact that a bundle of not clearly defined areas of activity or a lack of specified numbers of sub-target groups can be considered unspecific but nevertheless measurable at the end of a project. The number of measurable outcome indicators might be even higher. The vast majority of the indicators were also assessed as **relevant (49 out of 54 indicators)**, while **27 out of 54 indicators looked attainable**. For the remainder, a deeper analysis is required of relevance with respect to the underlying results hypotheses.

As for standard/exemplary indicators for TDA projects and cross-cutting issues, at this point, **no typical indicators could be derived**. The limited number of projects, the wide range of thematic areas covered and the high variance were not promising in this regard.

Standard/exemplary indicators

The use of standard/exemplary indicators in international cooperation projects has been discussed repeatedly in recent years. In this context, the question '*which standard or exemplary indicators for relevant TDA projects and cross-cutting issues (especially resilience and social cohesion) can be derived'* was explored in the interviews with the project management staff. To obtain as objective an assessment as possible, the interviewees were not directly asked whether they considered the indicators to be standard/exemplary, but whether they would recommend the indicators to other TDA projects. In about a quarter of the cases, i.e. three out of 13, the interviewees said they would not recommend the

indicators to other TDA projects (Int_6, 7, 10, 11, 12). Three different reasons were given. According to one interviewee, the indicators were very much dependent on the particular local and national context and thus not easily transferable (Int_7). They questioned the idea of universally usable indicators for the same reason and recommended indicators be developed for each country individually, oriented towards the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Another reason for not recommending the respective indicators of a project was there is no classic TDA project, so indicators are not transferable to other TDA projects[21] (Int_12, 5). Some interviewees criticised the fact that project indicators were formulated at the activity level (output) rather than at the outcome level, which discouraged recommendation (Int_11, 10, 8, 6).

In six out of 13 cases, the interviewees considered the indicators of their projects as partially recommendable. The experience of the Qudra programme in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional') shows that output-focused indicators (such as counting beneficiaries, etc.) tend to be easier to handle than outcome-focused ones[22]. Such indicators would definitely be recommended to other TDA projects. Difficulties arose, however, with indicators that aim to measure changes in social tension, i.e. social cohesion. A possible modification of this difficult-to-measure construct would be to focus on subjective perceptions rather than objective reductions of social tension. According to the same group of interviewees, it would also be advisable to formulate the indicators more broadly, to have maximum flexibility to respond to the fragile and frequently changing environment (Int_1). As an example of a more broadly formulated indicator, the following was cited: 'Community-based activities in the area of livelihood and economic opportunities will benefit 1,560 households (7,800 individuals) of host communities, IDPs and refugees'. The indicators of the project in Haiti (CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti') were also assessed as partly recommendable, especially the measurement of the application of newly acquired knowledge *(*revised indicator 3: 65 community tank management committees (195 individuals) demonstrate, by example, that they apply the knowledge acquired to ensure water quality and to use the resource economically) and the increase in production quantities (indicator 4: 300 farmers have increased their production of food crops per hectare by an average of 20%). These would be measurable. However, the interviewees recommended that the indicators should define more precisely what is meant by a household (see indicators 1 and 2). This being said, it is very difficult to define a household in rural Haiti (e.g. a family, an extended family, a group cultivating a farm together, or a collection of farms). It was noted that the concept of households would make little sense in the field of TDA, as this area would often involve working with displaced individuals. Instead, a per capita measurement was recommended by the interviewee (Int_13). In the livestock farming and agriculture project in Somalia (Somaliland) (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia'), the indicators on milk production (indicator 2: 40% of 400 milk producers and 30% of 80 local female traders have increased their income by 20% by using improved practices, such as better milk hygiene and milk cooling) and access to water (indicator 4: 80% of 4,000 selected agro-pastoral and pastoral households, 10% of them headed by women, have increased access to water) proved feasible and successful. In both cases, the 'before and after' could be measured well. The remaining two indicators were viewed rather critically and, accordingly, would not be recommended for other TDA projects. Indicator 1 (40% of 3,500 pastoralists and agro-pastoralists (men, women and young people) have increased their income from livestock farming by 20%) was seen as problematic, since the data that would be needed to measure the indicator are not available for cultural reasons. In Somalia (Somaliland), people would not talk about how many animals they sell. Animals are only sold when needed, as wealth is not measured by the sale of animals but by the growth of the herd. However, the goal of the project was to increase productivity, not the size of the herd. Accordingly, the indicator does not fit the socio-cultural conditions. Moreover, a nutrition-related indicator (indicator 3: 60% of 500 selected agro-pastoral households, 10% of them headed by women, have increased their production and consumption of cereals, fruit, vegetables and/or

[21] The project was originally designed as a Technical Cooperation (TC) project. However, since there were no financial resources for TC projects in Turkey, the project design was adapted in order to be able to use TDA funds.

[22] From a methodological point of view, the evaluation team cannot support this opinion.

fodder crop) is not recommended based on the experience in Somalia (Somaliland), as nutritional behaviour is extremely difficult to measure. This is mainly due to inaccurate data resulting from recall bias (Int_14).

Only in four cases – in South Sudan (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'), Turkey (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey'; CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey') and Northern Iraq (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq') – did the interviewees confirm that all of the projects' indicators were fully advisable for other TDA projects focusing on food security, access to education, TVET and clean water and sanitation, respectively. The indicators of the project in South Sudan would cover the three main areas that matter in a context of food security and would interact well: (1) sustainable production increase (indicator 1: in 800 households, improved, resource-efficient agricultural production methods are implemented for the sustainable management of natural resources) and (2) income generation (indicator 2: 400 households generate 10% additional income through the establishment of resource-conserving agricultural farming practices; indicator 3: 100 households (30% of which are headed by women) have diversified and increased their income by 10% through small-scale enterprises). The latter, in turn, allows for food diversification. Since food security plays a major role in the field of TDA, these indicators could be identified as standard/exemplary indicators for the corresponding area (Int_15). Regarding the education programme for Syrian refugees and host communities in Turkey (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey'), both interviewees agreed that all indicators could theoretically be recommended for other TDA projects (Int_2, 3). However, it was pointed out that Turkey has different prerequisites from other countries, especially in the field of education, which would need to be taken into account when applying the indicators to other contexts (Int_3). Indicator 1 *(*22,500 Syrian and Turkish children and young people in Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis and Hatay attend classes in schools rehabilitated according to MoNE standards) and indicator 2 (70% of the 600 trained teachers (of whom 40% are female) confirm on a scale of 1–3 that their skills in teaching mixed groups of Syrian and Turkish students have increased to 2 or 3) would both require collaboration with political partners, which, depending on the political situation, could make implementation difficult. Indicator 3 (25,000 Syrian and Turkish children and young people participated in extracurricular educational and recreational activities) would be easy to achieve, however. With regard to the last indicator, an increase in the number of beneficiaries would be worth considering for the same reason (Int_3). In another TDA project, also conducted in Turkey (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey'), all three indicators cover relevant areas of TVET projects[23]: number of people using labour-market services (indicator 1), number of people regularly attending courses at technical high schools and vocational education centres (indicator 2) and number of people participating in measures promoting social cohesion and community initiatives, such as cultural events (indicator 3) (Int_4). In addition, a minimum percentage of 30% women is taken into account in all three indicators. The indicators of the Northern Iraq project (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq') were also recommended for TDA projects in general[24]. All three outcome indicators (number of inhabitants having access to drinking-water supply and/or sanitation; number of beneficiaries of labour-intensive construction measures; development of an option to redesign the institutional structure of the water sector) were assessed as specific and measurable. In addition, the consideration of different population development scenarios while developing strategies, as described in indicator 3, was considered particularly important, as situations may change rapidly, especially in the area of TDA (Int_9).

In summary, **a variety of indicators were identified by the interviewees that might be suitable as standard/exemplary indicators**. From a methodological point of view, however, not all indicators suggested address the outcome level, although in the CPEs under evaluation, they were presented as outcome indicators (presumably in accordance with BMZ). In the **TVET sector,**

[23] In this case, two project staff members were interviewed. One confirmed they would recommend all four indicators for other TDA projects for the reasons mentioned (Int_4), whereas the other interviewee would not recommend them, as it was not a classic TDA project and therefore the indicators were not transferable to other TDA projects (Int_5).

[24] In this case, two project staff members were interviewed. One confirmed they would recommend all four indicators for other TDA projects for the reasons mentioned (Int_9), whereas the other interviewee would not recommend them, because they were formulated at output rather than outcome level (Int_8).

indicators measuring (1) 'number of people using labour-market services', (2) 'attendance of TVET courses' and (3) 'number of people participating in measures promoting social cohesion and community initiatives' were conclusive. For projects focused on **access to education**, indicators measuring (4) 'class attendance in rehabilitated schools', (5) 'number of trained teachers confirming improved teaching skills' and (6) 'number of children that participated in extracurricular educational activities' have proven to be successful. For **WASH projects**, indicators of the (7) 'number of households having access to drinking-water supply and/or sanitation', (8) 'number of beneficiaries of labour-intensive construction measures', (9) 'redesign of the institutional structure of the water sector', (10) 'application of newly acquired knowledge on water quality and sustainable use' and (11) 'increase in production quantities' were measurable. And finally, in the **agricultural sector**, indicators measuring (12) 'agricultural production increase', (13) 'additional income through agricultural farming practices', (14) 'access to water' and (15) 'diversification of income' were recommended. By contrast, indicators depicting 'increased income from livestock', 'consumption quantities' or 'social cohesion' were strongly discouraged by the interviewees, as the data for these would, according to their experience, either not be available for cultural reasons or be difficult to measure.

Those indicators recommended by interviewees for other TDA projects were closely reviewed by the evaluation team. Table 2 shows that the evaluation team would recommend the majority of the indicators as example/standard indicators, but with a few restrictions.

Table 2: Evaluation team's assessment of possible example/standard indicators

Sector	Indicator	Recommendation by the evaluation team (yes/no; with adjustments)
TVET	'number of people using labour-market services'	Yes, however, the group and type of labour-market services to which the indicator refers need to be specified.
TVET	'attendance of TVET courses'	Yes, this indicator is recommended, but at output rather than outcome level.
TVET	'number of people participating in measures promoting social cohesion and community initiatives'	Yes, this indicator is recommended, but at output rather than outcome level.
Education	'class attendance in rehabilitated schools'	Yes, in this case, it is important to establish the link to the activity. The indicator makes sense only if it can be assumed that the measures of the project lead to an increase in attendance.
Education	'number of trained teachers confirming improved teaching skills'	Yes, but again, the link to the measure must be established, i.e. only if teaching skills are taught.
Education	'number of children that participated in extracurricular educational activities'	Yes, this indicator is recommended, but at output rather than outcome level.
WASH	'number of households having access to drinking-water supply and/or sanitation'	Yes.
WASH	'number of beneficiaries of labour-intense construction measures'	Yes, this indicator is recommended, but at output rather than outcome level.
WASH	'redesign of the institutional structure of the water sector'	No. This indicator is not specific enough. It would need to be clarified what exactly is meant by redesign of the institutional structure.
WASH	'application of newly acquired knowledge on water quality and sustainable use'	Yes.
WASH	'increase in food-crop production quantities'	Yes.
Agricultural sector	'agricultural production increase'	Yes.
Agricultural sector	'additional income through agricultural farming practices'	Yes, but always in terms of net gain, i.e. taking into account the resource input.
Agricultural sector	'number of households that have increased access to water'	No, the indicator is not specific enough.
Agricultural sector	'diversification of income'	No, not specific enough.
Agricultural sector	'increased income from livestock'	Yes.
Agricultural sector	'consumption quantities'	No, not specific enough.
Cross-sectoral	'social cohesion' (measured as 'tensions have decreased by 3 points on a scale from 1 to 10')	Yes. When operationalising social cohesion, in the context of TDA, it might be sufficient to focus on the (inter-)subjective perception of social tensions.

4.5 Impact contributions

Addressing goals at impact level

To answer the question '*which goals at impact level were explicitly and implicitly addressed?',* the CPEs were systematically screened for overarching development goals to which the projects sought to contribute. This revealed that the **projects were well in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).** In particular, the following 20 overarching development goals (separated into SDGs and TDA-specific goals, such as strengthening resilience[25]) were explicitly or implicitly addressed in descending frequency (see Table 3): inclusion[26] (nine out of 10), strengthening resilience (seven out of 10), SDG 5 'gender equality' (six out of 10), social cohesion (six out of 10), SDG 4 'quality education' (five out of 10), SDG 1 'no poverty' (four out of 10), SDG 3 'good health and well-being' (four out of 10), SDG 2 'no hunger' (four out of 10), SDG 16 'peace and justice' (three out of 10), SDG 6 'clean water and sanitation' (three out of 10), SDG 8 'decent work and economic growth (three out of 10), SDG 10 'reduced inequalities' (three out of 10), SDG 11 'sustainable cities and communities' (three out of 10), SDG 13 'climate action' (three out of 10), SDG 9 'industry, innovation and infrastructure' (two out of 10), SDG 15 'life on land' (one out of 10) and finally, SDG 12 'responsible consumption and production' (one out of 10). The only Sustainable Development Goals not addressed in any of the projects were SDG 7 'affordable and clean energy', SDG 14 'life below water' and SDG 17 'partnerships for the goals'. From a project perspective, contribution to a minimum of three to a maximum of 13 overarching development goals was envisaged. On average, across all 10 reports, the achievement or expected achievement of the intended overarching development goals was rated relatively high, at 31 out of 40 points (see section 4.5 on impact).

[25] It is not always clear which goals are specific to TDA and which to SDGs.

[26] Social inclusion is defined as the process of improving the terms of participation in society, particularly for people who are disadvantaged, through enhancing opportunities, access to resources, voice and respect for rights (UN, 2016).

Table 3: Overarching development goals addressed in the 10 CPEs

Overarching development goals	CPE 1 'Agriculture South Sudan'	CPE 2 'Agriculture Somalia'	CPE 3 'WASH Haiti'	CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine'	CPE 5 'TVET Iraq'	CPE 6 'WASH Iraq'	CPE 7 'Health Iraq'	CPE 8 'TVET Turkey'	CPE 9 'Education Turkey'	CPE 10 'Qudra'	Total
Resilience	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	7
Social cohesion				X	X		X	X	X	X	6
Inclusion	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	9
SDG 1: No poverty	X[27]	X	X							X	4
SDG 2: Zero hunger	X	X	X							X	4
SDG 3: Good health and well-being	X[28]	X					X			X	4
SDG 4: Quality education		X			X			X	X	X	5
SDG 5: Gender equality	X	X	X	X					X	X	6
SDG 6: Clean water and sanitation		X	X			X					3
SDG 7: Affordable and clean energy											0
SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth					X			X		X	3
SDG 9: Industry, innovation and infrastructure		X		X							2
SDG 10: Reduced inequalities		X							X	X	3
SDG 11: Sustainable cities and communities		X		X						X	3
SDG 12: Responsible consumption and production		X									1
SDG 13: Climate action	X	X	X								3
SDG 14: Life below water											0
SDG 15: Life on land	X										1
SDG 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions					X		X			X	3
SDG 17: Partnerships for the goals											0
Total	**8**	**13**	**7**	**6**	**6**	**3**	**4**	**3**	**5**	**12**	**67**

[27] This SDG was not explicitly mentioned as one of the goals addressed by the project. However, it was listed among the possible interactions between social, economic and environmental outcomes. Improved food security and increased incomes (SDG 2) sought by the project through supporting small-scale food producers enable and reinforce the 'no poverty' goal (SDG 1), since they are essential to reducing poverty and eradicating extreme poverty.

[28] This SDG was not explicitly mentioned as one of the goals addressed by the project. However, it was listed among the possible interactions between social, economic and environmental outcomes. The improved food security and income generation targeted by the project may also improve health (SDG 3), as providing people in vulnerable situations with sufficient, safe and nutritious food helps reduce maternal and child mortality.

Contribution to goals at impact level

In contemplation of the question '*to what extent have the projects contributed to the overarching development goals?'* a comparison was made between the goals addressed by the respective projects and those to which they actually contributed (highlighted in green, see Table 4*).*

Table 4: Contribution to overarching development goals

Overarching development goals	CPE 1 'Agriculture South Sudan'	CPE 2 'Agriculture Somalia'	CPE 3 'WASH Haiti'	CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine'	CPE 5 'TVET Iraq'	CPE 6 'WASH Iraq'	CPE 7 'Health Iraq'	CPE 8 'TVET Turkey'	CPE 9 'Education Turkey'	CPE 10 'Qudra'	Total
Resilience	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	7/7
Social cohesion				X	X[29]		X[30]	X	X	X	4/6
Inclusion	X	X	X	X	X[31]	X	X		X	X	6/9
SDG 1: No poverty	X	X	X							X	4/4
SDG 2: Zero hunger	X	X[32]	X							X	4/4
SDG 3: Good health and well-being	X	X					X			X	4/4
SDG 4: Quality education		X			X			X	X	X	5/5
SDG 5: Gender equality	X	X	X[33]	X					X	X	4/6
SDG 6: Clean water and sanitation		X	X			X					3/3
SDG 7: Affordable and clean energy		(X[34])									(1)/0
SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth					X[35]			X		X	1/3
SDG 9: Industry, innovation, infrastructure		X		X							2/2
SDG 10: Reduced inequalities		X							X	X	3/3
SDG 11: Sustainable cities and communities		X		X						X	2/3
SDG 12: Responsible consumption and production		X									0/1
SDG 13: Climate action	X	X	X								2/3
SDG 14: Life below water											0/0
SDG 15: Life on land	X										1/1
SDG 16: Peace, justice and responsible institutions					X		X			X	3/3
SDG 17: Partnerships for the goals											0/0
Total	8/8	11/14	5/7	4/6	3/6	3/3	3/4	2/3	5/5	12/12	56/67

[29] The available information is contradictory. In one of the two interviews, the contribution was confirmed, while in the other interview it was denied. From a conservative statistical decision rule, we assume that no significant contribution was made.

30 See footnote 26.

[31] See footnote 26.

[32] According to the interviewees the project definitely made a contribution to SDG 2. However, the extent to which it contributed to improving food and nutrition security cannot be determined, owing to insufficient evidence and a much too broad and imprecise indicator (see CPE 2, p. 32).

[33] The available information is contradictory. In one of the interviews, the contribution was confirmed, while in the CPE it was denied. From a conservative statistical decision rule, we assume that no significant contribution was made.

[34] This was not a goal targeted by the project at its inception. However, an extremely important contribution to affordable and clean energy was made, according to the interviewee. It was recommended that a regionally widespread plant be harvested, dried and burnt instead of firewood, which led to a significant reduction in tree felling. However, since this section only deals with the achievement of targeted overarching development goals, this contribution was not included in the calculations.

[35] See footnote 26.

The assessment of which overarching goals were actually contributed to was based on the CPEs and the interviews with project management staff[36]. It was found that the **projects made a valuable contribution to the planned goals at impact level.** From the total of 67 overarching goals that were set, 55, i.e. 82%, were contributed to by the 10 TDA projects. Consequently, no contribution was made to 18% of the goals that were initially envisaged.

Figure 5: Contribution to overarching development goals

When interpreting the results, it should be noted that the absence of a cross in the table does not necessarily mean there was no contribution to the target. In several CPEs, it was pointed out that the extent to which the project contributed to the overarching development goals could not be determined, since some of the impact hypotheses could not be conclusively investigated. This was for a variety of reasons: lack of data (CPE 6, 8, 4, 3, 2, 10); the presence of external trends impeding the achievement of the intended impact-level results (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'); lack of systematic follow-up (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq'; CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey'); imprecise indicator (CPE 6, 5, 2); very long causal chains (CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq'); CPE 4, 'Emergency Ukraine'); and absence of control or comparison groups (CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq'). This made it difficult to make a conclusive assessment with regard to the initial question. Nevertheless, based on the CPEs and interviews, the **contribution of project activities to 55 out of a total 67 overarching goals[37] can be confirmed** (see Figure 5).

When interpreting the findings, the fact that TDA projects form the basis of the analysis must be considered, as very aptly noted in CPE 2:

> *'The question […] to which extent the project has made an active and systematic contribution to its broad impact and scale-up mechanisms that have been applied must be seen in the light of the fact that it is a TDA project, i.e. responding to acute life-threatening needs while at the same time creating structures that make those affected less sensitive to emergency situations and help them to prevent future crises (continuum approach). […] this often gives such projects preparatory and pioneering qualities. The project's contributions to broad-scale impact and corresponding scale-up mechanisms are limited, as the FGD[38] and observations in the villages have shown […].'* (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia', p. 45)

[36] In a few cases where it was not clear from the CPEs whether a contribution was made or not, the interviewee's statement was used as the basis for evaluation.

[37] In total, there are 20 overarching results. The number 67 refers to the sum of all overarching goals addressed by the present projects.

[38] Focus group discussions.

Resilience

A key focus of project activities was strengthening resilience[39], the main overarching development goal of TDA, which was addressed in three quarters of the projects. Of particular note is that only four out of the seven CPEs that addressed resilience presented a definition of resilience; in the other cases, resilience is mentioned repeatedly, but it remains unclear what exactly is meant by it. A closer look at the project descriptions and their theories of change revealed that the way resilience was addressed varied significantly across projects.

Five broad categories of approach to strengthening resilience were able to be identified by the evaluation team: through enhanced food security (CPE 1, 2, 3); improved strategic water management (CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia'; CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'); stabilised economic resilience[40], i.e. the ability of individual households to cope with or recover from a shock and adapt to changing economic circumstances (CPE 1, 2, 5, 10); disaster risk reduction (CPE 4, 'Emergency Ukraine'); and child protection activities (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'). The goal of enhancing food security was to be achieved through the introduction of agricultural production methods adapted to climate change (e.g. adoption of dry-season vegetable production). Further, water-supply systems were constructed for livestock watering, irrigation and drinking-water supply. Part of the activities also involved strengthening partners' capacities to maintain water supply and sanitation through strategy development. Regarding income generation and economic diversification, measures focused on: stabilising economic conditions through vocational training to increase employment opportunities, increasing attention to non-agricultural activities in order to strengthen the resilience of households to the negative impacts of climate change through non-agricultural income, reducing production losses and creating a platform for governments and other stakeholders of the project countries to foster exchange on strategies and policies to improve future prospects for refugees and host communities. Finally, investing in disaster risk-reduction aimed to strengthen the capacities of the national emergency system in terms of basic protection of the local population and IDPs, as well as empowering communities at high risk in terms of their self-administered emergency management.

To conclude, the concept of community resilience encompasses many different aspects in the CPEs under evaluation. In terms of improved resilience, the possibilities to improve it varied greatly between localities, given the differing general conditions. In all seven cases, it was confirmed that the projects had contributed to improved resilience among the target groups. Nevertheless, doubts were expressed with regard to two projects as to whether the resilience of the target groups was improved and their livelihoods stabilised sufficiently to enable a swift recovery after acute shocks or stresses (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'; CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia').

[39] Strengthening the capacity of the local population to help themselves so that they could shape their own development in a sustainable and participatory manner (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan', p. 21); 'The ability of people and institutions – whether individuals, household, local communities or states – to withstand acute shocks or chronic stress caused by fragile situations, crises, violent conflict or extreme natural events, and to adapt and recover quickly without compromising their medium and long-term prospects' (BMZ; 2013:7; CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq', p. 39; CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p.8); 'Strengthening their adaptation and coping capacities contributed to their ability to better mitigate negative impacts' (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional', p. 5).

[40] The term economic resilience was only explicitly mentioned in CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'. CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan', CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia' and CPE 5, 'TVET Iraq' were assigned to economic resilience based on the evaluation team's assessment. The term economic resilience was not defined in any of the CPEs. The definition used by the evaluation team is the following: the ability of individual households to cope with or recover from a shock and adapt to changing economic circumstances.

4.6 Non-intended effects

Non-intended positive effects

Several positive effects were identified across the projects analysed and were assigned to seven categories. It must be acknowledged, however, that the **majority of the projects analysed did not systematically monitor unintended positive or negative effects** (CPE 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10[41]), as illustrated in Figure 6. Only two projects systematically monitored unintended effects, but only positive effects, not negative ones. Accordingly, the list below is only based on observations provided by stakeholders and the evaluation team.

Economic aspects:

- ✓ **Development of income-generating activities:** by improving transport infrastructure for project purposes, a positive by-product was increased income from trade and cash-for-work activities. Further positive impacts on the local economy cited were cooperation with local construction companies and the use of sodium for water treatment (CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti'; CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'; CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'; CPE 7, 'Health Iraq').
- ✓ **Positive impact on local economy:** the cooperation with local construction companies and the use of sodium for water treatment had a positive impact on local economic development (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'; CPE 7, 'Health Iraq').
- ✓ **Economic empowerment of women and girls** was found to be greater than expected in some projects, enabling the beneficiaries to strengthen their role in society (CPE 1, 10, 2).

Cooperation:

- ✓ **Enhanced capacity of local NGOs:** through technical exchanges the project management and financial management skills of representatives of civil society improved (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq'; CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq').
- ✓ **Improved cooperation between different stakeholders** in the health sector – including a hospital – in Northern Iraq (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq').
- ✓ **Enhanced cooperation between different directorates** in Northern Iraq regarding the

Figure 6: Application of systematic monitoring of unintended effects



[41] No relevant information could be found in CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan' or CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia'. However, in the interviews with the respective project managers (Int_14, 15), it was confirmed that there was no systematic monitoring.

development of relevant WASH policies (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq').

- ✓ **Leverage effects for further implementation measures**, such as the construction of new rehabilitation centre for IDPs planned by the World Health Organisation (WHO); extension of services at a women's centre by offering breast-cancer screening or construction of an emergency unit; in addition, some NGOs extended priority measures to maximise results (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq'; CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq').

Education:

- ✓ **Integration of refugees into the host countries' education system:** better participation in the Turkish education system by Syrian children through addressing the language barrier by providing language classes (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey').

(Psycho)social aspects:

- ✓ Improved **family relationships** as a positive result of increased empowerment of women (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan').
- ✓ Increased **self-confidence** and self-reliance among beneficiaries, as a result of gaining skills that improved their employability and/or the income generated through the employment secured (CPE 9, 1, 5).
- ✓ **Knowledge-sharing** beyond the scope of the project, e.g. knowledge about water conservation gained through the project was shared; beneficiaries of the agricultural component were reported to have trained non-beneficiaries, which allowed the project to have multiplier effects and involve more people (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq'; CPE 3, 'WASH Haiti').

Environment:

- ✓ Less **environmental degradation** caused than anticipated, thanks to greater use of energy-efficient cooking stoves, which led to less use of firewood and charcoal. In addition, income gained from cash-for-work activities replaced the need to cut down trees to generate revenue (CPE 1, 2, 3).

Health:

- ✓ The **health of beneficiaries was able to be promoted** in a variety of ways, through (1) the use of improved cooking stoves, resulting in fewer health-damaging pollutants; (2) higher consumption of vegetables, which has positive effects on the general health status, and increased breast feeding; (3) more competent handling of chemicals and (4) a lower accident rate thanks to improved transport infrastructure (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'; CPE 2, 'Agriculture Somalia').

Conflict and security:

- ✓ More reliable and comprehensive **protection and security measures**[42] than expected during the implementation of project activities offered by the local authorities (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan').

Furthermore, a number of anecdotal references was made to other non-intended positive effects, such as: the overachievement in terms of number of beneficiaries, owing to reallocation of funds (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'); increased use of the social development centres in Lebanon, e.g. more visitors, wider range of services offered, such as psychosocial support (CPE 10, 'Qudra regional'); improved knowledge of farmers about saving in the form of assets (goats, etc.) (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan'); and significant savings at household level through the construction of a pump station (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq').

Non-intended negative effects

In contrast to this, however, several non-intended negative effects occurred that also need to be considered. After a detailed analysis, it can be summarised that **significantly fewer non-intended negative effects were recorded than non-intended positive effects.** Nevertheless, as already noted, owing to the lack of monitoring systems, the following list makes no claim as to completeness. Non-intended negative effects identified were assigned to six categories, as follows:

- ✓ **Creation of frustration** among different stakeholders due to not fulfilling expectations, e.g. beneficiaries who, despite having participated in training courses, could not find jobs; activities unable to continue

[42] Owing to lack of information in the CPE, this aspect was taken up again in the discussion with staff from the project management. Regarding the comprehensive protection and security measures, reference was made to the work of a security company that had guarded the offices rented on site. There were no assaults during the entire project period (Int_15).

because of low government budgets, which also led to fully equipped centres being unused; medium outflow pressure resulted in stress for staff that was also passed on beneficiaries (CPE 10, ‘Qudra regional’; CPE 5, ‘TVET Iraq’).

- ✓ **Vulnerability criteria disregarded:** e.g. a school was built in a wealthier neighbourhood, with the result that the target group did not have access to it; the Leave No One Behind (LNOB) concept was not consistently implemented, meaning disabled people were not included in the programme (CPE 5, TVET Iraq; CPE 10, ‘Qudra regional’).
- ✓ **Poor communication and disagreements over the project approach:** e.g. weak communication during the implementation phase provoked complaints from beneficiaries and had a negative impact on the image of GIZ, which was accused of not having kept its promises; disagreements about cooperation and steering structure had a negative impact on project implementation and led to significant delays in, for example, the provision of healthcare (CPE 3, ‘WASH Haiti’; CPE 7, ‘Health Iraq’).
- ✓ **Overgrazing effects** have been reported in one project, which aimed to enhance the resilience of selected households and stabilise their livelihoods through the efficient use of existing natural resources. An inadequate introduction to livestock farming and grazing was mentioned as the reason why there was premature restocking (CPE 2, ‘Agriculture Somalia’).
- ✓ **Emergence of new conflicts:** different kinds of conflicts were reported, e.g. in one case, after a needs assessment was carried out, employees of the implementing organisation were threatened by community members if no action followed; in another project, conflicts were reported with unlicensed drivers of school transport vehicles, who felt disadvantaged compared with the new licensed drivers; landlord disputes and a conflict between livestock keepers and farmers emerged over water use following the construction of hand-dug wells as part of a project to support vegetable production (CPE 3, ‘WASH Haiti’; CPE 10, ‘Qudra regional’).

Measures for mitigation or prevention

This section aims to answer the question to what extent and in which way the non-intended negative effects mentioned in the previous section could have been prevented or mitigated. To this end, two things should first be noted. None of the CPEs examined developed and/or documented mitigation measures for project-related non-intended negative effects; instead, the mitigation strategies addressed risks that were assumed to pose a potential threat to the achievement of the intended outcomes. Risks and non-intended negative effects are, conceptually, very closely linked, but in the cases under evaluation, the risks identified by the projects partially differed from the non-intended negative effects that actually occurred[43]. To gain a better understanding of the negative impacts that activities can have on target groups it is essential to analyse such risks. Following, therefore, is a summarised presentation of the risks mentioned, together with recommendations for mitigation or prevention.

[43] This counterintuitive finding can be explained either by the fact that the risk assessment was not performed in sufficient detail or by the fact that no systematic monitoring of the non-intended effects took place. It is also conceivable that not all non-intended negative effects could have been foreseen, no matter how well the risk assessment was conducted.

Table 5: Measures for mitigation or prevention of assumed risks

Possible risk(s)	CPE	Measures for mitigation/prevention
Security risks for staff, target beneficiaries, civil society actors and programme implementation	Qudra regional – CPE 10; Education Turkey – CPE 9; Health Iraq – CPE 7; WASH Iraq – CPE 6; Agriculture South Sudan – CPE 1; WASH Haiti – CPE 3	✓ Establishment of a security and risk management system ✓ Observation by local staff with necessary networks ✓ Continuous exchange with the programme management, the teams, and the GIZ Risk and Security Management office ✓ Evacuation plan for deployed personnel ✓ Mediation of steering committee and parties involved ✓ Networking with security-relevant actors ✓ Avoidance of areas with tense security situation in consultation with the programme management and the GIZ Risk and Security Management office ✓ Strong anchoring of projects in the community ✓ Context- and conflict-sensitive project implementation and monitoring (taking 'do no harm' principles into account) ✓ Training of staff in organisational safety and security management protocol ✓ Building capacity of local staff so that they can continue operation with minimal remote support
Numerous personnel changes in important partner authorities, which might affect capacity building (e.g. changes in government through elections; leadership changes at ministerial level)	Qudra regional – CPE 10; Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2	✓ Close coordination with the political executing agencies
Considerable delays in programme implementation (due to increased centralisation of decisions; administrative processes at headquarters and the country office)	Qudra regional – CPE 10; Education Turkey – CPE 9; WASH Iraq – CPE 6	N/A in CPEs
No adequate labour-market absorption capacity (leading to frustration among participants in employment-promoting training activities)	Qudra regional – CPE 10	N/A in CPEs
Reinforcement of existing intercommunal and inter-ethnic conflicts and/or creation of new conflicts (e.g. risk of being perceived as taking sides in the conflict; envy and jealousy among the beneficiaries)	Qudra regional – CPE 10; Agriculture South Sudan – CPE 1; Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2; Education Turkey – CPE 9; WASH Iraq – CPE 6	✓ Mapping of conflict and fragility context of the project ✓ Regular community dialogue ✓ Community entry strategy ✓ Awareness-raising regarding peaceful co-existence ✓ Coordination with other stakeholders ✓ Locating the project in more peaceful areas ✓ Inclusion of final beneficiaries in decision-making ✓ Conflict-sensitive monitoring during implementation ✓ Implementation of activities according to the 'do no harm' principle ✓ Regular follow-up visits ✓ Use of traditional conflict management or mediation practices ✓ All beneficiaries receive the same amount of support

		✓ Reliance on a criteria-based and transparent selection process for priority measures ✓ Consideration of all groups (host communities, refugees and vulnerable groups)
Natural disasters (e.g. extreme droughts, flooding, cyclones, plant pests, epidemic spread of human and animal diseases), which can have a dramatic impact on the economy and availability of production resources	Agriculture South Sudan – CPE 1; Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2; WASH Haiti – CPE 3; WASH Iraq – CPE 6	✓ Capacity building at national and regional administrative level, i.e. training and workshops on Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards and disaster preparedness)
Inaccessibility of target area/ target groups because of the rainy season, security reasons, roadblocks and closed borders preventing the transport of supplies, equipment and personnel in the project area or the prohibition of the exercise of certain measures (e.g. educational and psychosocial measures)	Agriculture South Sudan – CPE 1; Qudra regional – CPE 10; WASH Haiti – CPE 3; WASH Iraq – CPE 6; Education Turkey – CPE 9	✓ Employment and training of local staff ✓ Early supply of project inputs ahead of the rainy season ✓ Procurement of project inputs at local level as much as possible ✓ Monitoring of accessibility through information update from United Nations – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) ✓ Providing internal security information from the project field staff ✓ Close involvement of target groups in planning and implementation of activities ✓ Selection of areas of activity or implementing measures according to security requirements ✓ Application of 'do no harm' principle ✓ Provision of support to selected civil society partners in promoting freedom of expression
Unstable macroeconomic environment (devaluation, inflation, financial crisis resulting in limited partner contributions and low motivation of unpaid public servants, conflicts in the region preventing market access)	Agriculture South Sudan – CPE 1; Qudra regional – CPE 10; WASH Iraq – CPE 6; Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2	✓ Non-partisan approach[44] ✓ Coordination with security networks (UNDSS, NGO Forum, etc.) ✓ Strict budget control ✓ Open communication regarding financial limitations ✓ Reliance on criteria-based and transparent selection process for priority measures
'Uncooperative' stakeholders or limited partner contributions, which is expressed, for example, as reluctance of the target group to adapt to changing conditions; evaluation approach is not accepted by interviewees and stakeholders	Agriculture South Sudan – CPE 1; Health Iraq – CPE 7; Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2; Qudra regional – CPE 10	✓ Participatory and transparent approaches
Unstable political situation (e.g. parliamentary elections; political tensions between donor and recipient country) that impact the implementation of the project	Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2; WASH Iraq – CPE 6; Education Turkey – CPE 9	✓ Working with local and regional consultants
Unexpected cost developments, especially for supplies and equipment, poor quality of construction supplies, price increases, changes in exchange rate	WASH Haiti – CPE 3; Health Iraq – CPE 7	N/A in CPEs
Corruption (public-private). ***Instrumentation of the project*** by	WASH Iraq – CPE 6; Qudra regional– CPE 10	✓ Monitoring of the political and local contexts

[44] This refers to an approach that does not support or help any particular political party, group or section. Additionally, it is linked to the humanitarian principle of neutrality, whereby humanitarian actors (e.g. JOIN) must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, economical or ideological nature.

interest groups (e.g. manipulation of results, attempts to influence the selection of construction companies)		✓ Participatory and transparent approaches ✓ Use of local expertise regarding stakeholder intentions ✓ Conflict sensitivity ✓ Tendering processes
Large influx of new refugees into the country due to ongoing conflicts in a neighbouring country, which might create conflicts over land	Education Turkey – CPE 9; Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2	N/A in CPEs
Continued exodus of medical staff	Health Iraq – CPE 7	N/A in CPEs
Lack of funding (e.g. banking system limits the availability of funds)	WASH Iraq – CPE 6; Qudra regional – CPE 10	N/A in CPEs
(Violent) non-state actors interfere with the course of evaluation. They may oppose development measures and exert pressure or violence on all actors involved	Qudra regional – CPE 10	✓ Monitoring of the political and local contexts ✓ Participatory and transparent approaches ✓ Use of local expertise regarding possible intentions of (violent) non-state actors, conflict sensitivity
Lack of coherence due to a large number of organisations active in that area, which, in extreme cases, even leads to some NGOs working against each other (e.g. food deliveries prevent pastoralists from changing tack and hamper economic activities)	Qudra regional – CPE 10; Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2	✓ Continuous monitoring of the actor landscape ✓ Close coordination and cooperation with other donors, government institutions and Civil Society Organisations ✓ Clear and transparent communication on the objectives and activities of the project
Non-trained employees are dismissed by employers in cases where graduates were newly employed	Qudra regional – CPE 10	N/A in CPEs
Discrimination of people with disabilities due to lack of full implementation of inclusive concepts	Qudra regional – CPE 10	✓ Full implementation of inclusive concepts (based on the LNOB principle)
Risks around the water supply. Water levels might decrease owing to the building of dams; water supply system will not be sufficient should the refugee and IDP crisis deteriorate	WASH Iraq – CPE 6	N/A in CPEs
Health and security risks resulting from chlorine gas (i.e. chlorine gas was stored for disinfection under insufficient secure conditions on the premises)	WASH Iraq – CPE 6	✓ Introduction of electrolysis technology to generate chlorine from sodium on the spot and to immediately dissolve the chlorine in water
Political blockades by national and local authorities	Qudra regional – CPE 10	✓ Constant monitoring of the general political conditions ✓ Constant, close and trusting exchange with the partner authorities
Quality issues for priority measures conducted in cooperation with civil society or private actors (damage to roads and pavements, water pipes not buried deep enough, proximity to grey water, etc.)	WASH Iraq – CPE 6	✓ Quality control by the project ✓ Retention of a certain percentage of the pay for one year in case of warranty claims
Potential socio-cultural misunderstandings	Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2	✓ Continuous communication and cooperation with the village development committee, local NGOs and local authorities
Results/outputs will not be maintained (lack of long-term resources and capacities at individual, organisational, societal or political level in the partner country to ensure the continuity of the results; lack of follow-up through responsible	Agriculture Somalia – CPE 2; Qudra regional – CPE 10	✓ Development of exit strategies

partners; or third parties absorb the output and disadvantage existing target group)		

Note: N/A=No mitigation strategy was indicated in the CPEs.

As seen in Table 5, the link between outcome and impact levels is subject to numerous risks. Some of the risks mentioned are largely determined by external actors and natural events. Therefore, the relevant project's potential for risk mitigation was limited. Generally speaking, however, it is true that 'conflict-sensitive implementation principles, such as the systematic application of the 'do no harm' principle and forward-looking risk management at the management level, can reduce vulnerability to these risks and increase the effectiveness of the project' (CPE 1, 'Agriculture South Sudan', p. 26).

4.7 Results of the fuzzy-set QCA

The fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) was preceded by a document analysis of 10 CPEs covering a total of 13 TDA projects (see section 2). Five relevant variables that potentially influence 'project success' and the 'absence of non-intended negative effects' were selected in consultation with GIZ. Documents were then reviewed accordingly. These variables, called causal conditions, are as follows: 'use of (Integrated) Peace condition or an outcome is present (1), somewhat present (0.67), not particularly present (0.33) and not present (0). Based on content considerations, different scales were chosen for the causal condition 'quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring' (0; 0.5; 1) and the outcome variable 'absence of non-intended negative effects' (0; 1), as described in detail below.

Projects featuring comparatively extensive use of (I)PCA were rated as 1, projects with limited use of (I)PCA as 0.67, projects that used the (I)PCA of a and Conflict Assessment ((I)PCA)', 'quality of results-based monitoring', 'quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring', 'indicator quality' and 'degree of adaptive project management'. Thus, the number of causal conditions chosen is in line with Berg-Schlosser and de Meur's (2008) recommendation to include between four and six causal conditions in an intermediate-N analysis, i.e. n ranges between 10 and 40 cases (here: n=13).

Coding of causal conditions and outcomes

A major advantage of fsQCA – which is a development of the original QCA version[45] (Ragin, 2000) – is that the variables used no longer need to be dichotomised but can assume values of between 0 and 1. This allows a degree of membership to be expressed. Although the values '1' and '0' (full membership and non-membership) remain as extreme values, quantitative graduations of originally qualitative concepts are possible. Therefore, all variables have to be coded in advance. Following rating during the document analysis, a four-point scale was generally applied to differentiate whether a project operating in the same country and regions as 0.33 and those that did not use an (I)PCA as 0, as shown in Table 6.

Accordingly, the causal conditions 'quality of results-based monitoring', 'quality of indicators' and 'degree of adaptive project management' were assigned to a four-point scale (see Tables 7–9), while 'quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring' was rated on a three-point scale (see Table 10).

Table 6: Use of (I)PCA on a four-point scale (n=13)

(I)PCA was not used (0)	(I)PCA of a project operating in the same country and regions was used (0.33)	(I)PCA was used to a limited extent (0.67)	(I)PCA was extensively used (1)
CPE 3, WASH Haiti CPE 4, Emergency	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan	CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia CPE 9, Education Turkey	CPE 6, WASH Iraq

[45] General QCA is limited to the analysis of bivariate outcomes, i.e. yes/no variables, and is, therefore, often too simplistic to explain gradual differences. Hence, fuzzy QCA is applied, which retains key features of the general QCA approach, while introducing fuzzy membership scores, i.e. the varying degree to which cases belong to sets.

(I)PCA was not used (0)	(I)PCA of a project operating in the same country and regions was used (0.33)	(I)PCA was used to a limited extent (0.67)	(I)PCA was extensively used (1)
Ukraine CPE 5, TVET Iraq CPE 7, Health Iraq CPE 8, TVET Turkey		CPE 10, Qudra Jordan CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon CPE 10, Qudra Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Iraq	

Note: 0=(I)PCA was not used at all; 0.33=(I)PCA of project operating in the same country and regions (e.g. preceding project) was used but project did not develop its own (I)PCA; 0.67=(I)PCA was used to a limited extent (only at the beginning of the project to obtain a general overview, but beyond that there was no intensive use, (I)PCA was not regularly updated, (I)PCA did not influence the implementation); 1=(I)PCA was extensively used (formed an important part of the implementation of the project). Source: own calculation based on CPEs and interviews with project staff.

Table 7: Quality of results-based monitoring on a four-point scale (n=13)

Lack of formalised results-based monitoring (0)	Comparatively weak results-based monitoring (0.33)	Comparatively rather good results-based monitoring (0.67)	Comparatively good results-based monitoring (1)
CPE 3, WASH Haiti CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine	CPE 7, Health Iraq CPE 8, TVET Turkey	CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia CPE 5, TVET Iraq CPE 9, Education Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Jordan CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon CPE 10, Qudra Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Iraq	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan CPE 6, WASH Iraq

Note: 0=Lack of formalised results-based monitoring (majority of output and outcome indicators not monitored and/or no periodic data collection, lack of baseline data); 0.33=Comparatively weak results-based monitoring (mainly activity monitoring and/or only output indicators monitored, no systematic data collection, not up to date, lack of baseline data, lack of outcome monitoring); 0.67=Comparatively rather good results-based monitoring (majority of output indicators monitored, up to date, lack of systematic outcome monitoring, baseline data may be set at zero or partly missing); 1=Comparatively good results-based monitoring applied (systematic and regular data collection, baseline data available and not generally set at zero, covering relevant indicators at output and outcome level, up to date, oriented at current results model and/or results matrix). Source: own calculation based on CPEs and interviews with project staff.

Table 8: Quality of indicators with respect to SMART criteria on a four-point scale (n=13)

Indicator quality is comparatively low (0)	Indicator quality is comparatively rather low (0.33)	Indicator quality is comparatively rather high (0.67)	Indicator quality is comparatively high (1)
CPE 10, Qudra Jordan CPE 10, Qudra Turkey	CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon CPE 10, Qudra Iraq	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan CPE 3, WASH Haiti CPE 7, Health Iraq CPE 8, TVET Turkey	CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine CPE 5, TVET Iraq CPE 6, WASH Iraq CPE 9, Education Turkey

Note: 0=The indicator quality is comparatively low (the project indicators cover, on average, less than 50% of the SMART criteria); 0.33=The indicator quality is comparatively rather low (the project indicators cover, on average, between 51% and 64% of the SMART criteria); 0.67=The indicator quality is comparatively rather high (the project indicators cover, on average, between 65% and 79% of the SMART criteria); 1=The indicator quality is comparatively high (the project indicators cover, on average, at least 80% of the SMART criteria), percentages are calculated over all indicators at outcome level. Source: own calculation based on own assessments from CPEs.

Table 9: Adaptation of project management on a four-point scale (n=13)

Project management was comparatively not adaptive (0)	Project management was comparatively less adaptive (0.33)	Project management was comparatively more adaptive (0.67)	Project management was comparatively fully adaptive (1)
CPE 3, WASH Haiti		CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan	CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia

Project management was comparatively not adaptive (0)	Project management was comparatively less adaptive (0.33)	Project management was comparatively more adaptive (0.67)	Project management was comparatively fully adaptive (1)
		CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine CPE 5, TVET Iraq CPE 8, TVET Turkey	CPE 6, WASH Iraq CPE 7, Health Iraq CPE 9, Education Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Jordan CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon CPE 10, Qudra Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Iraq

Note: Owing to the lack of variance of self-assessments in interview statements, the assessment of adaptation of project management is solely based on the number of points indicated in the CPEs (section 4 – Relevance dimension), whereby a maximum of 20 points could be achieved. In the case of CPE 1, however, the scaling was slightly different, i.e. instead of 20 points, a maximum of just 10 points could be achieved. To enable comparability, the score achieved in CPE 1 was multiplied by two, i.e. 16 out of 20 points instead of 8 out of 10 points). 0=10–12 points, 0.33=13–14 points, 0.67=15–16 points, 1=17–18 points. Source: own calculation based on CPEs.

Table 10: Quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring on a three-point scale (n=13)

Lack of conflict-sensitive monitoring (0)	Partial (not systematic) conflict-sensitive monitoring (0.5)	Systematic and comprehensive conflict-sensitive monitoring (1)
CPE 3, WASH Haiti CPE 5, TVET Iraq CPE 7, Health Iraq CPE 8, TVET Turkey	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine CPE 9, Education Turkey	CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia CPE 6, WASH Iraq CPE 10, Qudra Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon CPE 10, Qudra Jordan CPE 10, Qudra Iraq

Note: 0=Lack of conflict-sensitive monitoring; 0.5=Conflict-sensitive monitoring is neither systematic nor comprehensive, but informal (e.g. through informal and/or irregular exchange rounds); 1=Systematic and comprehensive/formal conflict-sensitive monitoring. Source: calculation based on CPEs.

While ‘use of (I)PCA’, ‘quality of results-based monitoring’, ‘quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring’, ‘indicator quality’ and ‘adaptation of project management’ were identified as key causal conditions, the assessment of ‘project success’ and ‘avoidance of non-intended negative effects’ provided the data basis for outcome measurement.

To measure ‘project success’, averages of achieved scores in three different assessment dimensions were taken from the CPEs: effectiveness dimension 1, i.e. ‘The project achieves the objective on time and in line with the project objective indicators agreed upon in the contract’; effectiveness dimension 2, i.e. ‘The services implemented by the project successfully contribute to the achievement of the project objective’; and impact dimension 2, i.e. ‘The project contributed to the intended overarching development results’. In a second step, the minimum and maximum scores achieved by the projects under evaluation were set as extremes and, based on these data, four categories were created, to which the projects were then assigned. Subsequently, ‘comparatively successful projects’ (90–96 points) were coded as 1, ‘comparatively rather successful projects’ (84–90 points) as 0.67, ‘comparatively rather less successful projects’ (78–83 points) as 0.33 and comparatively less successful projects’ (71–77 points) as 0, as displayed in Table 11. Table 11 shows that only the agriculture project in South Sudan was assigned to the highest category, followed by eight comparatively rather successful projects. The TVET project in Iraq was the only comparatively rather less successful project, while the agriculture project in Somalia (Somaliland), the WASH project in Haiti and the education project in Turkey were assigned to the lower end of the rating scale.

Table 11: Comparative project success on a four-point scale (n=13)

Project was comparatively less successful (0)	Project was comparatively rather less successful (0.33)	Project was comparatively rather successful (0.67)	Project was comparatively successful (1)
CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia CPE 3, WASH Haiti CPE 9, Education Turkey	CPE 5, TVET Iraq	CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine CPE 6, WASH Iraq CPE 7, Health Iraq CPE 8, TVET Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Jordan CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon CPE 10, Qudra Turkey CPE 10, Qudra Iraq	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan

Note: 71–77 points=comparatively less successful; 78–83=comparatively rather less successful; 84–89=comparatively more successful; 90–96=comparatively successful. Source: own calculation based on CPEs.

Table 12 shows the binary assignment of the projects examined with respect to the outcome variable 'absence of non-intended negative effects'. CPEs in which the occurrence of non-intended negative effects was not mentioned and where interviews with project management did not reveal any non-intended negative effects were coded as 1. Those in which non-intended negative effects were observed and/or reported in interviews were assigned a 0. Overall, for four projects, non-intended negative effects were neither observed in their CPE nor mentioned by interviewed project staff, while for nine projects, non-intended negative effects were reported, as displayed in Table 12.

The main objective of conducting this fsQCA was to identify recipes, i.e. configurations of causal conditions, for project success, as well as for the absence of non-intended negative effects. Unlike symmetric correlation-based methods that rely on matrix algebra, fsQCA uses Boolean algebra to compare cases and identify putative causal conditions. This approach is based on four key assumptions: (1) most often, not one factor but a combination of factors leads to the outcome; (2) different combinations of factors can produce the same outcome, i.e. principle of equifinality; (3) a condition can have different effects on the outcome, depending on its combination with other factors; and (4) the presence and the absence of a specific outcome may be explained by different recipes. fsQCA differs from other approaches in that not only the presence but also the absence of a particular factor in a configuration is considered influential for the outcome. The software Tosmana (Cronqvist, 2016) was used to conduct this intermediate-N analysis (n=13).

Table 12: Avoidance of non-intended negative effects on a two-point scale (n=13)

Non-intended negative effects were observed (0)	Absence of non-intended negative effects/non-intended negative effects were not observed (1)
CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan
CPE 3, WASH Haiti	CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine
CPE 5, TVET Iraq	CPE 6, WASH Iraq
CPE 7, Health Iraq	CPE 9, Education Turkey
CPE 8, TVET Turkey	
CPE 10, Qudra Jordan	
CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon	
CPE 10, Qudra Turkey	
CPE 10, Qudra Iraq	

Note: Given that most of the projects examined had not systematically monitored non-intended negative effects, the fact that non-intended negative effects were not mentioned does not necessarily equate to their actual absence. However, assessments in CPEs and non-reporting by interviewees are taken as proxies for the absence of severe non-intended negative effects.

Truth table

To answer the question '*which of the independent variables (causal conditions) coded above play a role in project success and the avoidance of unintended negative effects*?', two different QCA models were calculated. Model 1 aims to explain differences in TDA projects' success by considering five causal conditions: 'use of (I)PCA', 'quality of results-based monitoring', 'quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring', 'indicator quality' and 'adaptive project management'. The purpose of Model 2 is to explain the conditions required for the avoidance of significant non-intended negative effects in TDA projects. In this model, only four causal conditions were included; 'indicator quality' was left out, as neither a causal link between the SMARTness of indicators (which refer to intended effects) nor the occurrence of non-intended negative effects could be plausibly established.

The data for both models were summarised in a so-called truth table, in which zeros were assigned to cells in which the phenomenon of interest can (rather) not be observed, while ones were assigned to cells in which the phenomenon of interest is (rather) present[46]. The table contains all possible combinations, i.e. configurations, of values that can be assumed by the variables included. The quantity of all logically possible configurations can be calculated by 2^k (where k is equal to the number of causal conditions). For example, in the case of five causal conditions, as in Model 1, the truth table contains a total of 32 rows. Similarly, the truth table for Model 2 contains a total of 16 rows (2^4). Tables 13 and 14 show only those rows with real-world observations for project success or absence of non-intended negative effects, respectively. Instead of ones and zeros, black dots for (rather) presence of case membership of a given variable and white dots for (rather) absence were chosen. In either case, both manifestations of the outcome are included, i.e. project success (O1) versus no project success (O2) in Table 13, and absence of non-intended negative effects (O1) versus observation of non-intended negative effects (O2) in Table 14. Both variants were considered, as, according to the underlying principles of QCA, the presence and the absence of a specific outcome may be explained by different recipes.

[46] Please note, for example, that the 'absence of non-intended negative effects' has therefore been coded as 1.

Table 13: Truth table for 'project success' (Model 1)

No.	Cases	(I)PCA	QRBM	QCSM	SMART	Adaptation	O1	O2
1	CPE 3, WASH Haiti	○	○	○	●	○	○	●
2	CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine; CPE 7, Health Iraq; CPE 8, TVET Turkey	○	○	○	●	●	●	○
3	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan; CPE 5, TVET Iraq	○	●	○	●	●	○	○
4	CPE 9, Education Turkey	●	●	○	●	●	○	○
5	CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia; CPE 10, Qudra Jordan; CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon; CPE 10, Qudra Turkey; CPE 10, Qudra Iraq	●	●	●	○	●	●	○
6	CPE 6, WASH Iraq	●	●	●	●	●	○	○

Note: (I)PCA: use of (I)PCA; QRBM: quality of results-based monitoring; QCSM: quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring; SMART: quality of indicators according to SMART criteria; Adaptation: adaptive management; O1: outcome 1=project success; O2: outcome 2=no project success.

Table 14: Truth table for 'absence of non-intended negative effects' (Model 2)

No.	Cases	(I)PCA	QRBM	QCSM	Adaptation	O1	O2
1	CPE 3, WASH Haiti	○	○	○	○	○	●
2	CPE 4, Emergency Ukraine; CPE 7, Health Iraq; CPE 8, TVET Turkey	○	○	○	●	○	○
3	CPE 1, Agriculture South Sudan; CPE 5, TVET Iraq	○	●	○	●	○	○
4	CPE 9, Education Turkey	●	●	○	●	●	○
5	CPE 2, Agriculture Somalia; CPE 6, WASH Iraq; CPE 10, Qudra Jordan; CPE 10, Qudra Lebanon; CPE 10, Qudra Turkey; CPE 10, Qudra Iraq	●	●	●	●	○	○

Note: (I)PCA: use of (I)PCA; QRBM: quality of results-based monitoring; QCSM: quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring; SMART: quality of indicators according to SMART criteria; Adaptation: adaptive management; O1: outcome 1=absence of non-intended negative effects/no non-intended negative effects were observed; O2: outcome 2=non-intended negative effects were observed.

Given the small number of cases, a frequency threshold of 1 was set, meaning configurations representing only one case were not excluded from the analysis. In addition, a consistency threshold of 0.8 was chosen. Consistency refers to the percentage of causal configurations of similar composition that result in the same outcome value (Roig-Tierno et al, 2017). In other words, only those recipes that explain at least 80% of the cases were included in the fsQCA. At first glance, in both models, row two, row three and row five reveal that, for some countries, a common pattern can be found that leads to the respective outcome.

Interpretation of the results of Model 1 explaining comparative project success

Employing the Quine algorithm yields two combinations of conditions, called implicants or recipes, as displayed in Table 15. The fsQCA identified two types of projects that were comparatively successful:

- projects with a (rather) high degree of adaptive project management that (rather) made use of (I)PCA and exhibited a (rather) high quality of results-based monitoring and systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring, but which, at the same time, did not have rather SMART indicators, and

Prime implicants	Consistency	Coverage
GOODADAPTATION * (I)PCA* QRBM * QCSM* ~SMART	0.8179	0.4499
GOODADAPTATION * SMART * ~(I)PCA* ~QRBM*~QCSM	0.8681	0.3245

Table 15: Identification of set relationships for 'comparatively high project success'

Note: ~=(rather) not present; for QCSM: only partial or not present; GOODADAPTATION: adaptive management; (I)PCA: use of (I)PCA; QRBM: quality of results-based monitoring; QCSM: quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring; SMART: high quality of indicators according to SMART criteria; * is interpreted as 'and'.

- projects with a (rather) high degree of adaptive project management that had (rather) SMART indicators, but which, at the same time, (rather) did not make use of the (I)PCA and did not display a high quality of results-based monitoring or systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring.

A closer look reveals that a (rather) high degree of adaptive project management is a central factor for project success and is found in both recipes. However, differences between the two alternative pathways can be identified. The first implicant is consistent for 81% of our observations and covers about 45% of the cases, meaning for almost half the cases, the respective configuration is valid (Roig-Tierno et al, 2017). The second implicant is equally consistent for 86% of observations and covers almost one third of the cases, i.e. 32%[47]. Both paths are, to a considerable extent, inversely related. Their conditions as well as their characteristics (present vs absent) are inversed, except for the first one, i.e. adaptive project management. This means that adaptive project management is important for project success regardless of the specific recipe.

The first prime implicant emphasises (beyond the importance of adaptive project management) the use of (I)PCA, the quality of results-based monitoring and the quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring. If these four conditions are (rather) met in the sample under evaluation, a TDA project is comparatively successful, even if the SMARTness of its indicators is rather weak. The second path, by contrast, highlights the importance of adaptive project management in combination with a (rather) high quality of indicators with respect to fulfilling SMART criteria. Thus, TDA projects in the sample under evaluation were comparatively successful, even if an (I)PCA was not applied, the quality of results-based monitoring was low and conflict-sensitive monitoring was only partially or not present, provided that (beyond a high degree of adaptive project management) SMART indicators were given.

Thus, fsQCA confirms the important role of adaptive project management for the success of the projects under evaluation. In addition, the use of (I)PCA and the quality of results-based and conflict-sensitive monitoring were crucial for a considerable number of the (rather) successful projects. Nevertheless, SMART indicators may compensate in several cases for a lack of the aforementioned factors if projects are adaptively managed.

Table 16 summarises the solution. Both consistency and coverage values are around 80%, indicating considerable internal validity and power to explain variance in the outcome variable 'project success'.

To contextualise the results of Model 1, another fsQCA was conducted for the counterpart 'comparatively low project success'. The fsQCA identified only one type of project that was comparatively less successful (see Table 17):

- a project with (rather) SMART indicators, that (rather) did not make use of an (I)PCA, that (rather) lacked a high quality of results-based monitoring, where conflict-sensitive monitoring was not systematic, and which was (rather) not adaptively managed.

This result is consistent with the previous calculations, as it further points to the importance of adaptive project management, which, if absent, makes for comparatively less successful projects. It further supports the already indicated importance of the interaction of adaptive project management and SMART indicators for project success: while both

[47] Please be aware that several recipes may apply to one project, i.e. the sum of all coverages is above 100%. Hence, it is prohibited to add coverages.

Table 16: Results for 'project success'

Result	Consistency	Coverage
GOODADAPTATION * QRBM * QCSM* (I)PCA* ~SMART + GOODADAPTATION * SMART * ~QRBM* ~QCSM* ~(I)PCA	0.8382	0.7744

Note: ~=(rather) not present; for QCSM: only partial or not present; GOODADAPTATION: adaptive management; (I)PCA: use of (I)PCA; QRBM: quality of results-based monitoring; QCSM: quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring; SMART: quality of indicators according to SMART criteria; * is interpreted as 'and', + as 'or'. We did not exclude rows with only one case and only accepted recipes, i.e. combinations of conditions that explain 80% of the case analysed.

Table 17: Identification of set relationships for 'comparatively low project success' and result

Prime implicants/result	Consistency	Coverage
SMART * ~(I)PCA* ~QRBM * ~QCSM* ~GOODADAPTATION	1.000	0.2631

Note: ~=(rather) not present; for QCSM: only partial or not present; GOODADAPTATION: adaptive management; (I)PCA: use of (I)PCA; QRBM: quality of results-based monitoring; QCSM: quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring; SMART: high quality of indicators according to SMART criteria; * is interpreted as 'and'. The results for 'comparatively low project success' are not displayed. As the model only consists of one prime implicant, the full model is equal to this. We did not exclude rows with only one case and only accepted recipes, i.e. combinations of conditions that explain 80% of the case analysed.

causal conditions together seem to compensate for missing or weak application of (I)PCA and results-based monitoring, as well as a lack of systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring, Table 17 reveals that SMART indicators alone do not make a project successful. However, it has to be kept in mind that although the prime implicant shows a high consistency (100%), the coverage of 26% is to be assessed as considerably low. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the solution displayed in Table 17 applies only to single cases in our sample.

Interpretation of the results of Model 2 explaining absence of non-intended negative effects

Calculating the influence of various causal conditions on the absence of non-intended negative effects again yields a model with only one combination of conditions, as displayed in Table 18. In other words, the fsQCA identified one type of project in which non-intended negative effects were absent or not observed:

- a project with a (rather) high degree of adaptive project management that (rather) made use of (I)PCA exhibited a (rather) high quality of results-based monitoring and where

  conflict-sensitive monitoring was only partial, i.e. not systematic[48].

It is highly plausible that adaptive project management, use of (I)PCA and results-based monitoring, as well as at least partial, i.e. not systematic, conflict-sensitive monitoring are important to avoid non-intended negative effects. The result provides a hint that even where systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring is lacking, occasionally addressing conflict sensitivity and 'do no harm' in internal discussions (e.g. in ad hoc meetings with partners and/or donors) may allow the most significant non-intended negative effects to be anticipated and mitigated, at least for single cases in the sample under evaluation. However, it has to be taken into account that although the implicant is consistent for 100% of our observations, its coverage of 21% is considerably low, thus applying only to single cases. Against this backdrop, the calculation of the fsQCA for the counterpart, the presence of non-intended negative effects, is of particular importance. The fsQCA again identified only one type of project where non-intended negative effects occurred (see Table 19):

- a project that (rather) lacked adaptive management, made (rather) no use of (I)PCA, had a (rather) poor quality of results-based monitoring and where conflict-sensitive monitoring was only partial, i.e. not systematic, or absent.

[48] According to descriptive analysis in such cases conflict-sensitive monitoring is at least partial.

Table 18: Identification of set relationships for 'absence of non-intended negative effects' and result

Prime implicants/result	Consistency	Coverage
GOODADAPTATION * (I)PCA * QRBM * ~QCSM	1.000	0.2078

Note: ~=(rather) not present; for QCSM: only partial; GOODADAPTATION: adaptive management; (I)PCA: use of (I)PCA; QRBM: quality of results-based monitoring; QCSM: quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring; * is interpreted as 'and'. The results for 'comparatively low project success' are not displayed. As the model only consists of one prime implicant, the full model is equal to this. We did not exclude rows with only one case and only accepted recipes, i.e. combinations of conditions that explain 80% of the case analysed.

Table 19: Identification of set relationships for 'occurrence of non-intended negative effects' and result

Prime implicants/result	Consistency	Coverage
~GOODADAPTATION * ~(I)PCA * ~QRBM * ~QCSM	0.8342	0.2767

Note: ~=not present; for QCSM: only partial or not present; GOODADAPTATION: adaptive management; (I)PCA: use of (I)PCA; QRBM: quality of results-based monitoring; QCSM: quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring; * is interpreted as 'and'. The results for 'comparatively low project success' are not displayed. As the model only consists of one prime implicant, the full model is equal to this. We did not exclude rows with only one case and only accepted recipes, i.e. combinations of conditions that explain 80% of the case analysed.

This result also points to the importance of systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring as, in its absence, i.e. only partial or no conflict-sensitive monitoring, the occurrence of non-intended negative effects is likely, at least based on single cases in our sample. Further, the model also highlights the complex interplay of the different conditions with respect to non-intended negative effects and similarly confirms the importance of adaptive project management, use of (I)PCA and good results-based monitoring, as, in their absence, projects from the sample under evaluation experienced non-intended negative effects. Although the model is consistent for 83% of our observations, it covers only 27% of the cases, and thus, again, only holds true for single cases of the sample under evaluation.

Overall, fsQCA results for Model 1 and Model 2 are in line with and support the findings of the qualitative analysis. The interplay of adaptive project management, SMART indicators, the use of (I)PCA and good results-based monitoring were important for the success of many projects and, in some cases, meant non-intended negative effects could be avoided. fsQCA-findings regarding the role of conflict-sensitive monitoring are more complex and not as straightforward to interpret. Systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring was a causal condition for comparative project success in a considerable number of cases from the sample under evaluation (with a coverage of the corresponding prime implicant of 45%). In other cases, however, projects were comparatively successful, despite lacking systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring (with a coverage of the corresponding prime implicant of 32%). In still other cases (with coverage of 26%), lack of systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring yielded comparatively less successful projects. Further, data provide a hint that, for some single cases, partial conflict-sensitive monitoring was sufficient to avoid non-intended negative effects (coverage: 20%). Yet, in other single cases, partial conflict-sensitive monitoring did not suffice to prevent the occurrence of non-intended negative effects (coverage: 27% for both, only partial or no conflict-sensitive monitoring). Thus, our QCA results did not allow complete separation of the role of partial conflict-sensitive monitoring versus no conflict-sensitive monitoring within the recipes presented to explain (i) the absence and (ii) the occurrence of non-intended negative effects. Nevertheless, qualitative data analysis underlined that even partial conflict-sensitive monitoring can sometimes make a difference. Further, it should be kept in mind that these results are limited to the insights from 13 CPEs and a limited number of interviews with selected project staff. Nonetheless, the fsQCA highlights important interaction patterns of factors explaining project success and, to a considerably lesser degree, provides insights regarding non-intended negative effects. Understanding them better could pave the way towards improved quality of TDA projects.

Reasons for exclusion of other potential causal conditions and outcome variables

Three other potential causal conditions – the 'level of fragility', 'quality of (I)PCA' and 'success factors (from Part A)' – as well as one potential outcome – 'degree of adaptive project management' – were excluded from the analysis for various reasons. First, the methodological obligation not to exceed the maximum number of causal conditions required a trade-off. Thus, theoretical reasoning and empirical testing of different model specifications was applied to identify and exclude causal conditions of less explanatory power. Given the overriding interest of the QSA to find out which variables influence project success as well as the absence of non-intended negative effects, regardless of whether the context is comparatively more or less fragile, the level of fragility was excluded in favour of including causal conditions that can be influenced by TDA implementers. The 'quality of (I)PCA' was excluded in acknowledgement of concerns of high multicollinearity, as a strong overlap with the causal condition 'use of (I)PCA' was expected. It is plausible that a (rather) high 'use of (I)PCA' strongly correlates with a (rather) high 'quality of (I)PCA' and vice versa. This holds true when replacing 'use of (I)PCA' with 'quality of (I)PCA' in the fsQCA: results showed two identical recipes with a coverage of 0.44 and 0.24, respectively. In addition, success factors identified in Part A of the QSA could not be included as causal conditions, as it remains unclear whether the fact that the interviewees did not mention them equates to their absence or, simply, that the interviewees did not pay attention to them. Thus, considering success factors in the fsQCA would have biased results strongly.

The 'degree of adaptive project management' was not included as a potential outcome, as it seems only partly reasonable that this emanated from the causal conditions under evaluation, i.e. 'use of (I)PCA', 'quality of results-based monitoring', 'quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring', 'indicator quality'. Thus, a high degree of adaptive project management is also possible in the absence of these causal conditions. This seems particularly conceivable when later project managers were not involved in indicator design and (I)PCA development at planning stage, but did follow a highly adaptive management approach. By contrast, it is plausible that adaptive project management can have a decisive influence on the success of a project. Thus, the 'degree of adaptive management' was instead included as an additional causal condition in the fsQCA.

5 Conclusions

Following the presentation of the findings of this evaluation synthesis in the previous section, this section presents the conclusions drawn from those findings and highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the projects analysed in terms of their evaluation design and other aspects arising from the evaluation questions. A closer examination of the results reveals a rather disparate picture. There is no area in which all projects performed (very) well and only a few areas in which all projects performed rather poorly.

Conclusion 1: *Clear similarities in the TDA projects were identified with regard to success factors.*

A total of **40 success and failure factors of TDA projects was identified**, clustered into four main categories: general political, economic and environmental conditions; managerial factors; cooperation factors; and implementation concept-related factors. The most frequently cited project-related success factors, i.e. those within the project's sphere of influence and that were mentioned in at least half of the CPEs, include: constant dialogue with stakeholders (10 out of 10), conflict sensitivity (eight out of 10), staff composition (e.g. quantity, level of competence) (seven out of 10), linking of the activity to local structures (seven out of 10), participatory approach (seven out of 10), adaptive project management (six out of 10), coordination with other actors (five out of 10), commitment of project staff (five out of 10), ownership (five out of 10) and sufficient financial resources (five out of 10).

Conclusion 2: *All TDA projects analysed failed to fully address the HDP nexus.*

In none of the projects were all the dimensions of the **humanitarian-development-peace nexus** fully addressed. However, three projects combined

humanitarian activities (e.g. construction of water boreholes in refugee camps, emergency feeding of livestock, repair work in refugee camps after flooding) with sustainable development activities (e.g. rehabilitation of infrastructure), resulting in a partial addressing of the HDP nexus, i.e. a double nexus. One of the **strengths** of these projects was the response to spontaneous needs in the field, which led to the inclusion of humanitarian activities in the implementation. Yet, a clear **weakness** was the insufficient consideration given to the peacebuilding aspect.

Conclusion 3: *The assessment of indicators at outcome level revealed that most TDA projects featured considerable weaknesses regarding the SMARTness of indicators.*

The assessment of the **SMARTness of indicators revealed considerable weaknesses**. In 38% of the cases, the indicator quality was low, i.e. project indicators covered less than 50% of the SMART criteria, or rather low, i.e. project indicators covered between 51% and 64% of the SMART criteria. In the remainder, the indicator quality was rated as rather high (project indicators covered between 65% and 79% of the SMART criteria) or high (project indicators covered min. 80% of the SMART criteria) with a frequency of 31% each. A closer look at the individual criteria underlying the SMARTness concept revealed that most indicators were time-bound and relevant, while their measurability, achievability and specificity had considerable potential for improvement.

Conclusion 4: *Various indicators were identified that are likely to be suitable as standard/exemplary indicators.*

For the different sectors in which the TDA projects operated, various indicators were identified by the evaluation team that might be suitable as standard/exemplary outcome indicators. In the TVET sector, indicators measuring (1) the number of people using labour-market services were conclusive. For projects focused on access to education, indicators measuring (2) class attendance in rehabilitated schools and (3) number of trained teachers confirming improved teaching skills have proven to be successful. For WASH projects, indicators regarding (4) the number of households having access to drinking-water supply and/or sanitation, (5) the application of newly acquired knowledge on water quality and sustainable use, and (6) the increase in food-crop production quantities were measurable. And finally, in the agricultural sector, indicators measuring (7) agricultural production increases, (8) additional income through agricultural farming practices, (9) increased income from livestock and the cross-sectoral indicator of (10) social cohesion, i.e. measured as the (inter-)subjective perception of social tensions, were recommended.

Conclusion 5: *The TDA projects made a valuable contribution to the planned goals at impact level.*

A **strength** to be highlighted is that 14 of the 17 SDGs were addressed. The actual contribution to the overarching goals, such as SDGs and TDA-specific goals, through project implementation was also mostly confirmed. Based on the CPE reports and the interviews, **of the total 67 overarching goals that were set, 55 (82%) were actually contributed to**. According to the CPEs, a particular focus was on strengthening resilience, the most important overarching objective of TDA. It is worth highlighting that in all seven cases where activities were aimed at strengthening resilience, stakeholders confirmed that the projects significantly contributed to improved resilience of the target groups. Regarding **weaknesses**, significant discrepancies between intended impact goals and actual contributions for the following seven overarching development goals were found: social cohesion, inclusion, SDG 5 gender equality, SDG 8 decent work and economic growth, SDG 11 sustainable cities and communities, SDG 12 responsible consumption and production, and SDG 13 climate action. A **further shortcoming** to be noted is that clear statements on contributions to overarching development goals can only be made if results-based monitoring of appropriate quality is available that also covers outcome and impact level (contributions to impact). Since this was not the case in all sample projects, some of the impact hypotheses could not be conclusively examined.

Conclusion 6: *Across all projects, there is a clear lack in monitoring capacity of non-intended effects.*

On the positive side, several non-intended positive and only a few non-intended negative effects were recorded by the projects. The latter included the creation of frustration among different stakeholders, failure to take vulnerability criteria into account, poor communication and disagreements about the project approach, and the emergence of new conflicts. **On the negative side**, all projects bar two lacked systematic monitoring of non-intended negative effects, while non-intended positive impacts were

only systematically monitored in two projects. Consequently, the listed non-intended effects can only be considered as an anecdotal and non-exhaustive summary of aspects observed by stakeholders.

Conclusion 7: *Of the causal conditions included in the fsQCA to predict project success and the absence of non-intended negative effects, the importance of 'adaptive project management' was confirmed across all pathways. All other variables, i.e. use of (I)PCA, SMART indicators, results-based monitoring and conflict-sensitive monitoring, played a more or less important role, depending on the combination of conditions of the respective pathway.*

The **fuzzy-set QCA identified two types of projects that were particularly successful**: (1) projects with a (rather) high degree of adaptive management that (rather) made use of (I)PCA and exhibited a (rather) high quality of results-based monitoring and systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring, but which, at the same time, (rather) did not possess rather SMART indicators; and (2) projects with a (rather) high degree of adaptive management and (rather) SMART indicators, which, at the same time, (rather) did not make use of the (I)PCA and did not display a high quality of results-based monitoring or systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring. The fsQCA identified one type of project that was comparatively less successful: projects with (rather) SMART indicators, that (rather) did not make use of an (I)PCA and that (rather) lacked high-quality results-based monitoring and systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring, and that were (rather) not adaptively managed.

Thus, fsQCA confirmed the important role of adaptive project management for the success of the projects under evaluation. In addition, the use of (I)PCA, the quality of results-based monitoring and systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring were crucial for a considerable number of (rather) successful projects. Nevertheless, SMART indicators may compensate in several cases for the lack of the aforementioned factors if projects are adaptively managed. However, SMART indicators alone do not make a project successful; the opposite is the case given the absence of the other factors.

Regarding non-intended negative effects, the fsQCA identified **one type of project in which non-intended negative effects are prevalent:** projects (rather) lacking adaptive management, which (rather) make no use of (I)PCA and feature a (rather) poor quality of results-based monitoring and whose conflict-sensitive monitoring is not systematic. This result further underlines the importance of adaptive project management, the use of (I)PCA and the high quality of results-based and systematic conflict-sensitive monitoring.

6 Recommendations

Based on the results of the present analyses, recommendations to maintain the current quality standard or improve the performance of TDA projects are provided. The recommendation section is structured according to the following key areas: (1) recommendations for the evaluation design and (2) recommendations for project implementation.

6.1 Recommendations for the evaluation design

Unless indicated otherwise, the following evidence-based recommendations concern project staff entrusted with the development and maintenance of the monitoring and evaluation system of projects. Recommendations for the evaluation design include:

- ✓ The **availability of a formalised and high-quality results-based monitoring system** is essential for making informed statements about the effectiveness of activities and ensures resources are used to achieve clearly defined and demonstrable results. Critical components of sustaining a results-based monitoring system include monitoring of output und outcome indicators, periodic data collection and reliable baseline data. For outcome-level indicators, special care should be taken to ensure that they are formulated at outcome level and not at output level.
- ✓ The **availability of a formalised and high-quality context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring system** plays a crucial role in project success, as it enables project staff to gain a detailed understanding of the context and potential for conflict, the activity itself and the interaction between the two. It is an important tool for identifying risks and anticipating potential unintended negative effects at an early stage and reacting accordingly. For this purpose, all three areas must be covered: conflict and context monitoring, risk and security monitoring, and

unintended effects monitoring. The latter is important for identifying non-intended negative effects that may occur and counteracting them, if necessary.

- ✓ The **use of an (Integrated) Peace and Conflict Assessment ((I)PCA)** is highly recommended in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. Even though all projects conducted an (I)PCA, its actual use was quite low. The (I)PCA should not only be conducted at the beginning of a project but also, if possible, updated regularly throughout its implementation. Recommendations derived from the (I)PCA should be used as a guideline for future actions, especially for context- and conflict-sensitive monitoring.
- ✓ The **SMART framework** is a useful way to assess the quality of indicators. However, most TDA projects feature considerable weaknesses regarding the SMARTness of indicators. **The greatest room for improvement was found in terms of specificity, attainability and measurability.** In other words, areas of activity or numbers of sub-target groups need to be more clearly specified in indicators**.** Apart from that, the feasibility of the project objective in the envisaged timeframe under the given contextual conditions should be critically examined and adjusted accordingly. To enhance measurability, more specific criteria that measure progress towards the achievement of objectives are needed, as are reliable data sources.
- ✓ Moreover, **indicators should also be checked for their cultural fit.** From the interviews with project staff, it became clear that this was not always the case. To avoid time loss due to repeated change offers, focus group discussions with local partners and stakeholders have proven helpful in gaining an in-depth understanding of cultural circumstances and they provide a good opportunity to back up the formulation of individual indicators.
- ✓ As is clear from this list of recommendations, having a consistent project M&E framework from the beginning is crucial. Consequently, a recommendation for GIZ is to include, when setting up the team, the **position of monitoring and evaluation specialist with sufficient time resources and comprehensive qualifications**.

6.2 Recommendations for project implementation

The diverse nature of the projects under evaluation meant it was not always possible to derive generally applicable factors of success and failure. Nevertheless, a few tendencies of TDA projects did emerge across the CPEs. The following recommendations relate in particular to project management.

- ✓ When implementing a TDA project, **attention should be paid to specific managerial factors.** These include[49], but are not limited to, staff composition, i.e. the assurance of a sufficient quantity of highly **competent project staff**, **adaptive project management** and a **functional steering structure**. Roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined to avoid frustration, and there should be an on-site team leader and consistent leadership.
- ✓ There is broad consensus regarding the **importance of cooperation factors** in project implementation. TDA projects should ensure **constant dialogue with all stakeholders** to create a basis of trust. Moreover, activities should be **linked to local structures**, strengthen existing institutions and involve local staff through employment and training to ensure lasting changes. In addition, a **participatory approach should be followed**, whereby not only project partners but also beneficiaries are involved in planning and implementation. In this way, **ownership** is maximised, which, in turn, has a positive influence on project success. The **commitment of project staff** needs to be ensured.
- ✓ To avoid overlapping or causing unintended negative effects, **coordination with other development actors** in the field is highly recommended.
- ✓ Lastly, it would be beneficial to take **implementation concept-related factors** into account. These include, among others, **the application of the 'do no harm approach'. This requires the application of context- and conflict-sensitive results-based monitoring.** Another related success factor is **sufficient funding and continued donor support**.

[49] At this point, only those that were explicitly mentioned by at least half of the CPEs are highlighted. For a complete list, see section 4.2.

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Annexes

Annex I: Raw data matrix of QCA

Case ID	IPCA	QIPCA	QRBM	QCSM	Fragility	Indicator quality	Type of indicator	Adaptability	Project success	Project success subjectiv
CPE 1	0,33	1	1	0,5	1	0,67	0	0,67	1	0,67
CPE 2	0,67	0,33	0,67	1	1	0,33	1	1	0	0,67
CPE 3	0	1	0	0	1	0,67	0,33	0	0	0,67
CPE 4	0	1	0	0,5	0	1	0,33	0,67	0,67	1
CPE 5	0	0,33	0,67	0	0,67	1	0	0,67	0,33	0,67
CPE 6	1	0,33	1	1	1	1	0,33	1	0,67	1
CPE 7	0	0,33	0,33	0	1	0,67	0	1	0,67	0,67
CPE 8	0	0	0,33	0	0	0,67	0,33	0,67	0,67	0,67
CPE 9	0,67	0,33	0,67	0,5	0	1	0,67	1	0	0,67
CPE 10	0,67	1	0,67	1	0	0	0,33	1	0,67	
CPE 10	0,67	1	0,67	1	0,33	0,33	0,33	1	0,67	
CPE 10	0,67	1	0,67	1	0	0	0,33	1	0,67	
CPE 10	0,67	0,67	0,67	1	1	0,33	0	1	0,67	1

Annex II: List of central project evaluations

CPE 1: ‘Adaptation of agricultural cultivation methods to climate change and stabilisation of livelihoods’ (2012.9830.6)

CPE 2: ‘Promoting livelihoods through improved livestock farming and and agriculture in Saaxil Region (Somaliland), Somalia’ (2016.1847.9)

CPE 3: Évaluation centrale de projet, ‘Amélioration des conditions de vie dans des communes souffrant de pénuries d’eau saisonnières dans le Sud-Est d’Haïti’ (2016.1844.6)

CPE 4: ‘Building emergency services capacity in Ukraine’ (2015.2068.3)

CPE 5: ‘Improving access for internally displaced persons, refugees and the population in host communities to education, vocational training and income generation in northern Iraq’ (2016.1845.3)

CPE 6: ‘Stabilising Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation for Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Host Communities in Dohuk Governorate, Northern Iraq’ (2016.1850.3)

CPE 7: ‘Improving healthcare for internally displaced persons, refugees and the local people in Dohuk Province’ (2016.1851.1)

CPE 8: ‘Technical and Vocational Education and Training and Employment Promotion for Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in Turkey’ (2016.1852.9)

CPE 9: ‘Education programme for Syrian refugees and host communities (BilSy)’ (2016.1853.7)

CPE 10: ‘Qudra – Resilience for Syrian Refugees, IDPs and Host Communities in Response to the Syrian and Iraqi Crises’ (2016.2027.7)

Annex III: Findings of contribution analysis

Sector	No° CPE	Hypotheses	Confirmation (by CPE evaluator)[50]	Confirmation (by evaluation team)	Evidence to confirm or disprove each hypothesis
Agriculture (CPE 1;2)	**CPE 1**	**Outcome level (1):**	**N/A**	**N/A**	Hypotheses at outcome and impact level could not be identified from this CPE
		Outcome level (2):	**N/A**	**N/A**	
		Outcome level (3):	**N/A**	**N/A**	
		Impact level (1):	**N/A**	**N/A**	
		Impact level (2):	**N/A**	**N/A**	
		Impact level (3):	**N/A**	**N/A**	
	CPE 2	**Outcome level (1):** Agropastoral and pastoral livestock farmers (APLFs) trained in livestock management, animal health and fodder production practice comprehensively what they have learned and thus are better prepared for a market-oriented livestock production.	Y	?	'The hypothesis in general can be confirmed, even if during the evaluation it was not possible to determine the extent to which farmers implement and apply what they have learned. The statements of the interviews were too imprecise and vague to be used as evidence. However, improved livestock production requires proactive herd management, which is noticeably lacking here. APLFs need to be trained and sensitised to adapt their herd size to the available feed and water supply.' (CPE 2 'Agriculture Somalia', p. 34)
		Outcome level (2): Milk producers and sellers who have received detailed training in milk hygiene and cooling and who have been equipped accordingly, will be able to reduce their production losses and sell a healthier end product on the market, thereby sustainably increasing their income.	Y	Y	'[The hypothesis] can be fully confirmed. Unfortunately, the increase in income can so far only be achieved by reducing milk losses or/and increased milk production and not due to better quality. The women, (traders) dominating the milk selling, do not yet pay better prices for cleaner and cooled milk, which is also due to the underdeveloped business capacity of producers.' (CPE 2 'Agriculture Somalia', p. 36)
		Outcome level (3): APLFs that are familiar with pest control and adapted agricultural practices, as well as using irrigation opportunities, are better able to consolidate their food and nutrition security and market-based production, and thus be more resilient and income empowered.	(Y)	(Y)	'In principle, this is confirmed by the target group, since irrigation and pesticide use are the most tangible and clearest agricultural successes […] But looking at the concept of measures for Output 3 (use of improved production methods, increase or diversified agricultural production, increased the consumption of fruit and vegetables, more water available for agriculture because of improve water reservoirs, promoting plant protection, promote energy saving stoves, control and promote the use of Prosopis), it appears as a haphazard mixture of activities. A clear concept and a stringent strategy regarding a productive, diversified and climate smart agriculture (including the consideration of production constraints) is missing.' (CPE 2 'Agriculture Somalia', p.39)
		Impact level (1): Improved management of natural resources including diversified agricultural production and product marketing ensures sustainable food and nutrition security, health and prosperity for agropastoral and pastoral households in the Saaxil region of Somaliland.	Y	Y	'To what extent the project has contributed to improving food and nutrition security cannot be determined due to insufficient evidence and a much too broad and imprecise indicator. However, the project contribution is roughly estimated at about 10% according to participative observations' (CPE 2 'Agriculture Somalia, p. 32)
		Impact level (2)[51]:			

[50] Note: Y= yes, confirmed, (Y)= partly confirmed, N= not confirmed, ?= evidence provided does not allow assessment, N/A = No information available in CPE.

[51] In CPE 2 (Agriculture Somalia) it is stated that the contribution to the overarching development results was reflected along three impact hypotheses. However, the report specified only one impact hypothesis, which is considered in the present analysis.

		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		Impact level (3): N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
WASH (CPE 3;6)	**CPE 3**	**Outcome level (1):** Increased number of cisterns, which significantly enhances the availability of safe water results in lower household expenditures.	Y	Y	Most interviewees confirmed that water availability has been improved. Before they had to walk about 8 km to find water, but now the distances have decreased a lot thanks to the project (translated from French, CPE 3 'WASH Haiti', p. 25). The availability of improved water has had other positive effects in the communities. The workload of women (and the time invested in fetching water) has been substantially reduced in the areas of activity. Women report that they now have more time for household chores or to work in the fields (translated from French, CPE 3 'WASH Haiti', p.27).
		Outcome level (2): Through the capacity-building activities, as well as the drought-adapted varieties introduced by the project, agricultural practices are now adapted to drought conditions and contribute to increased food security in the target area.	?	?	The interviewees confirm that their fields are yielding more crops. It is not possible to confirm whether the new practices are really adapted to the drought conditions, as during the implementation of the project no droughts have occurred. (translated from French, CPE 3 'WASH Haiti', p.27).
		Outcome level (3): N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
		Impact level (1): Saved resources resulting from improved water availability lead to increased resilience through the ability to pay for food, school fees, etc.	Y	Y	Interviews with beneficiaries indicate that they do have more money at their disposal thanks to income generated by cash for work (CfW) activities and the sale of agricultural surpluses on the markets. As a result, economic activities in the region have increased and people have more money to buy additional goods, including food or to pay school fees. As food security and education are key factors in community resilience, the evaluation concludes that the project has effectively contributed to the resilience of the of the beneficiary population living in the target area (translated from French, CPE 3 'WASH Haiti', p.34).
		Impact level (2): Saved resources resulting from improved water availability lead to increased resilience through reduced workload for women and children.	Y	Y	The availability of improved water has reduced the workload of women and children. Some women living in areas that have benefited from the new cisterns no longer have to travel long distances in search of water. As a result, some women save up to 4 hours per day, time that they can now invest in other domestic tasks, work in the fields, taking care of the children, etc. (translated from French, CPE 3 'WASH Haiti', p.34).
		Impact level (3): N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	CPE 6	**Outcome level (1):** The project enhances the resilience to maintain the water supply in Duhok through financing priority measures.	Y	Y	'In total, 19 priority measures […] were implemented aiming at improving drinking water supply and sanitation for more than 1.5 million refugees, IDPs and host communities […]. Priority measures maintained the quantity of water available in the whole of Faida sub-district at the level of 31,156 m3 each day […]. In the survey, stakeholders rate that the aim of enhancing resilience through priority measures is mostly achieved (outcome) […]. Through priority measures, 244,466 refugees, IDPs and host communities, who have endured a shortage in supply, have gained access to drinking water supply and sanitation that meet the minimum standards defined by the BRHA (outcome indicator 1 overachieved).' (CPE 6 'WASH Iraq', p. 33)

		Outcome level (2): The project enhances the resilience to maintain the water supply in Faida sub-district through constructing a new water supply system and related capacity development.	Y	Y	'In the survey, stakeholders rate that the aim of enhancing resilience through the Faida water supply system has largely been achieved (outcome).' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p.34)
		Outcome level (3): The project enhances partner capacities to maintain water supply and sanitation through strategy development.	Y	(Y)	'The strategy was developed in a series of workshops and meetings together with local stakeholders and finally presented to the Ministry of Municipality and Tourism, who officially acknowledges the strategy as a planning document […] the strategy (original outcome indicator 3 formulation) was fulfilled in the sense that women participated in the development process (see Table 6), but hardly in terms of identifying gender differentiated needs and activities in the strategy. Because the sector is highly male dominated and considering the KRI culture, achieving equal participation of women was challenging.' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p. 35) 'Stakeholders explain that the strategy is based on solid data (scenarios) and helps to focus on needs and plan for the immediate Future.' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p. 36)
		Impact level (1): The project result of strengthened capacities of local authorities to tackle challenges in the water sector contributes to more efficient water use.	Y	(Y)	'Stakeholders rate that the hypothesis 'more efficient water use trough capacity development' is true to a high extent and achieved to a medium extent […]. Impacts were achieved in a pilot area; this would not have happened without the project. Impact in terms of significantly more efficient water use in Dohuk Governorate (SDG 6.4 and 6.1) can only be achieved through longer-term processes and will be supported by the follow-on project. Stakeholders mentioned that government and communities still lack sufficient awareness about the importance of water resources. More reforms are necessary (metering, water law) while the KRG lacks resources for further capacity development and for operating the systems as required […].' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p. 44)
		Impact level (2): The project outcome of enhanced resilience to maintain the water supply contributes to universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all. This contributes to better living conditions and health of the whole population.	Y	Y	'Without the project, some villages might have required evacuation in times of drought and considerably more people would have suffered from a shortage of water […]. Access to clean water and better hygienic conditions and practices help preventing diseases […]. During project term, no major outbreaks of waterborne diseases occurred in camps. Camps as well as households saved money on bottled water or water trucking […].' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p. 45). 'Stakeholders rate that the hypothesis 'improved living conditions and health through access to safe and affordable water as a result of resilience (outcome)' is valid to a high and achieved to a medium extent […].' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p.46)
		Impact level (3): The project outcome of improved resilience to maintain the water supply contributes to universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all. This contributes to social cohesion.	Y	Y	'[…] This improves the living conditions of the local population, regardless of gender (GG1), age, income (AO1), origin (IDPs, refugees, hosts) or religion […]. One interviewee summarised that 'water is unifying; there is not special preference of water for any group' […]. The project operates within a coordinated approach, where different agencies ensure that all communities have access to basic services. Improved and equitable service delivery creates preconditions for peaceful living together and social cohesion…], while shortage of water results in tensions between inhabitants and between the population and local authorities […], as experiences in other areas of Iraq […]. Stakeholders rate that the hypothesis 'social cohesion through access to safe and affordable water as a result of resilience (outcome)' is valid to a rather high extent and achieved to a medium

					extent […]. So far, there have been no major conflicts over scarce water resources in Dohuk Governorate.' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p. 46) 'In addition, the project contributed to social cohesion by encouraging technicians and cash for work beneficiaries to work together […].' (CPE 6, 'WASH Iraq', p. 46)
Disaster Risk Management (CPE 4)	**CPE 4**[52]	**Outcome level (1):** Strengthened capacities of the national emergency system with regard to basic protection of the local population and IDPs leads to the availability of a participatory and comprehensive concept for emergency management to central actors at national level.	(Y)	(Y)	'For the indicator to be deemed successful, an overall concept at national level had to be implemented. While elements of the concept, such as the RIV [rapid intervention vehicle] structure, were successfully adapted at national level, no formalised, overall emergency management concept was made available to central actors at national level. Major decisions about redistributing responsibilities and finances were (at the time of the evaluation) still outstanding at national level. Therefore, the evaluators concluded that OCI 1 only partially contributed to the achievement of the overall outcome.' (CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine', p. 29).
		Outcome level (2): The strengthened capacity of the state emergency service of Ukraine (through the introduction of RIVs) leads the disposal of emergency management services which comply with standards to be developed at international or national level.	Y	Y	'The delivery of RIVs and training have enhanced the effectiveness of rescue operations in Ukraine and helped reduce the time it takes rescue teams to reach road accident sites. RIVs have boosted DSNS [state emergency service of Ukraine] rescue brigades' capacity for responding to road accidents. They have increased road safety in Ukraine thanks to the multiple tools and medical equipment on board. The delivery of modern equipment went hand in hand with the professional training of more than 300 DSNS staff (according to project team statement) who were taught to use and maintain the RIV rescue equipment and breathing apparatuses.' (CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine', p. 37).
		Outcome level (3): The empowerment in terms of self-administered emergency management of communes with a high risk potential leads to the introduction of new decentralised services and equipment and the application of new strategies by the state emergency service of Ukraine.	Y	Y	'Direct collaboration with individual rural municipalities is deemed a success, since their dynamic leadership made significant contributions to project outcomes. Other positive factors included direct communication channels between partners and GIZ at local level, and leveraging civil society's increasing readiness to contribute to public service delivery in the form of volunteerism. More effective services and social recognition at individual level were a valuable contribution in terms of strengthening civil society with rather limited means. The project showed how well-planned, trained and integrated local services can increase the security of the local population. GIZ's recognition is high at local level due to the timely delivery of much needed services and advice. The evaluation team visited Zaporizhia and the villages of Vesele and Shyrokoe to conduct interviews. These two villages in particular showed that, although support to selected communities in the east was on a small scale, it was still very valid, solid and successful and addressed the needs of one of the most neglected aspects of public service: integrated rescue services in rural areas.' (CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine', p. 31).
		Impact level (1): A strengthened emergency management system leads to reduced death tolls after emergencies and accidents (decrease by 15% for the five-year period 2015-2019).	Y	?	'At the time of the evaluation, outcome indicator 2 could not be fully assessed, as data for 2019 was not scheduled for release until after January 2020 […]. In interviews with three DSNS [State Emergency Service of Ukraine] staff members, all agreed that the number of deaths in fire and disaster situations in Ukraine for the five-year period 2015-2019 most likely decreased by at least 15% compared to the five-year period 2010-2015' (CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine', p. 44).

[52] The hypothesis are not explicitly mentioned in CPE4. They have been developed by the evaluation team from the ToC presented in the CPE.

					'For fire incidents, GIZ and DSNS [State Emergency Service of Ukraine] estimated 30% fewer casualties towards the end of the project in comparison with the casualties at the start of the project. GIZ attributed this to the modern fire-fighting equipment procured by GIZ since 2015 and to a series of trainings on equipment handling, and better emergency management and planning.' (CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine', p. 43).
		Impact level (2): A strengthened emergency management system leads to enhanced accountability and acceptance of state emergency services.	N/A	N/A	Evidence and assessment on this hypothesis are not provided in the CPE.
		Impact level (3): A strengthened emergency management system leads to a strengthened civil society at impact level[53].	Y	Y	'At national level, DSNS [State Emergency Service of Ukraine] reform in the context of decentralisation generated a positive impact, rendering services more responsive to local needs. Impact increased according to all sources in- terviewed, be these administrators of municipalities, regional stakeholders or DSNS [State Emergency Service of Ukraine] or KARS [Municipal Emergency Rescue Service 'Kyiv Rescue Service'] headquarters. Beyond these effects on decentralised municipalities and at local level, Ukraine's participation in the Sendai process also led to a reform of SSNS governance which benefited the population.' (CPE 4 'Emergency Ukraine', p.45)
TVET (CPE 5;8)	**CPE 5**	**Outcome level (1):**	N/A	N/A	Hypotheses at outcome and impact level could not be identified from this CPE.
		Outcome level (2):	N/A	N/A	
		Outcome level (3):	N/A	N/A	
		Impact level (1):	N/A	N/A	
		Impact level (2):	N/A	N/A	
		Impact level (3):	N/A	N/A	
	CPE 8	**Outcome level (1):** The improved technical (R27) and infrastructural (R25) capacities of IŞKUR have enabled IŞKUR to offer expanded and better adapted services to Syrian and Turkish job seekers (R24), who make use of these services in increasing numbers (R3).	(Y)[54]	(Y)	'Rising numbers of job seekers registered with IŞKUR [Turkish employment agency] countrywide are mainly attributable to mounting unemployment in Turkey; likelihood that the presence of IŞKUR Plus Offices [Turkish employment agency] on university campuses increases the number of mainly Turkish students using IŞKUR [Turkish employment agency] services; no figures on registration of refugee job seekers with IŞKUR [Turkish employment agency] available; project-supported IŞKUR services mainly target Turkish job seekers, but also some information provision in Arabic and English language, no data available on number of Syrian job seekers registered with IŞKUR [Turkish employment agency].' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey', p.47)
		Outcome level (2): The improved pedagogical skills of staff (R14) and enhanced teaching equipment (R13) allow TVET pilot schools to adapt their training offer to the refugee situation (R7), leading to the increased enrolment of Syrian and Turkish students at these schools (R4).	N	N	'Contributing to 'increased enrolment' of Syrian and Turkish students at the TVET pilot schools was an erroneous expectation for several reasons: a) Several pilot schools already suffer from overcrowding. They cannot accept additional numbers of students. b) Turkish and refugee students are not free to choose a TVET school, but are allocated to the schools by a centralised government distribution mechanism. The increased attractiveness of a school does not immediately lead to higher student numbers. c) Numerous external factors affect the ability of disadvantaged Turkish and refugee pupils to

[53] The latter concerned the influence of decentralisation in Ukraine. In terms of context, decentralisation was identified as a driver of DSNS mandate reform throughout the implementation period.

[54] Confirmed (for Turkish job seekers only)

					attend secondary education (e.g. need to work, family mobility, language problems). The attractiveness of the local TVET schools may not be the decisive factor.' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey', p.47)
		Outcome level (3): The training, study visits and advice provided to Directorate-General TVET staff at the Ministry of National Education (R12) improved their technical knowledge in the area of refugee integration (R11), which led to the development of tailored policies and strategies on integrating refugees into the formal vocational education system (R9).	(Y)	(Y)	'DG TVET [Directorate-General for Technical and Vocational Education] staff confirmed that the close cooperation with the project and the experience of the TVET pilot schools provided them with valuable knowledge on refugee integration into the TVET system' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey', p.48) 'DG TVET [Directorate-General for Technical and Vocational Education] did not publish a dedicated policy or strategy on refugee integration into the TVET system. However, it uses the project approach as a blueprint for larger projects funded by KfW [Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau] and the World Bank.' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey', p.48)
		Impact level (1): The increased utilisation of labour market services (R3) and the increased attendance at TVET pilot schools (R4) have led to higher numbers of skilled Syrian and Turkish workers available on the labour market (R2) and hence to their increased employment in the formal sector (R1).	?	?	'All job seekers currently have difficulties in finding employment, particularly in the formal sector. It is not possible to ascertain the impact of the project on formal employment, also of its direct and indirect beneficiaries.' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey, p.57) 'Economic difficulties and growing unemployment drive large numbers of skilled and unskilled workers on the labour market, but currently with limited employment prospects […]. Project activities may assist more skilled job seekers to access the labour market, but no relevant data are available.' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey, p.58)
		Impact level (2): The implementation of employment and cohesion-related community events (R8) improved social cohesion between the host community and Syrian refugees (R6).	Y	Y	'The socio-cultural and sports activities, partly involving students' parents, contributed to improved social cohesion at the TVET pilot schools, at least in the ongoing academic year. The impact of these activities on the wider community in the local neighbourhoods cannot be ascertained and is less likely […]. Overall, there are indications that relations between the host community and refugees are becoming more difficult.' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey, p.58)
		Impact level (3): Enhanced business and entrepreneurship support services (R23) together with improved awareness among Turkish businesses on employing refugees (R22) led to an increasing number of thriving businesses willing to employ Turkish and Syrian workers formally (R20) and finally an increased demand for skilled labour in the formal sector (R19).	?	?	'Some start-ups and Syrian businesses supported by the project may thrive in the future and employ additional staff, their ability to employ skilled workers on formal contracts depending on their sector and future economic circumstances, as well as on future government policy towards Syrian refugees in Turkey […].'(CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey, p.58) 'Low number of new businesses thriving because of project services (e.g. start-ups), business training was mainly focused on keeping existing SMEs [small and mid-size enterprises] in business and preventing lay-offs and closure, ongoing existence of strong incentives to employ Syrian and also Turkish workers informally, including informal arrangements, low oversight, ESSN [emergency social safety net] regulations and others' (CPE 8, 'TVET Turkey, p.58)
Education (CPE 9)	**CPE 9**	**Outcome level (1):** Training seminars train the teachers on appropriate topics needed to create an integrative environment for Syrian and Turkish children.	Y	Y	'Interviews with various respondent groups confirmed that the topics of the training were addressing the gaps related to MoNE capacity, even if the number of trained teachers was far from sufficient.' (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey', p. 31)
		Outcome level (2): Teachers create an integrative environment at schools, actually using what they have learned during training seminars.	Y	Y	'Teachers were found to be positive about their increased capacity after training and in conference, and they did use the acquired knowledge, depending on their enthusiasm.' (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey', p. 31)

		Outcome level (3): Work rules and environment allow teachers to use an adapted approach.	(Y)	(Y)	'Teachers confirmed MoNE engagement and approval; selection did not, however, prioritise poorest schools.' (CPE 9, 'Education Turkey', p. 31)
		Impact level (1): An improved learning environment with equal opportunities regardless of origin and facilitated intercultural dialogue would, in turn, foster social cohesion at impact level.	(Y)	(Y)	'Feedback from various respondent group indicated positive impact on social cohesion while the project was still running. They identified various threatening factors, but these were expected to occur only after the project had phased out. Mutual understanding/relationships have emerged, but many find these still in a fledgling state and at risk to taper off without external support.' (CPE 9 'Education Turkey', p. 39).
		Impact level (2): Mutual understanding and relationships emerged during the intercultural exchange and leisure activities continue to exist after the activities are phased out	(Y)	(Y)	'Mutual understanding/ relationships have emerged, but many find these still in a fledgling state and at risk to taper off without external support. Some stakeholders reported to be (partly) able to continue their engagement, but many also shared that they would need more and longer external support.' (CPE 9 'Education Turkey, p. 39)
		Impact level (3): N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Health CPE 7	**CPE 7**	**Outcome level (1):** Establishment of primary health care in camps through strengthening of primary healthcare centre operators**.**	Y	Y	'GIZ provides funding for NGOs and the Department of Health (DoH) (input) to operate four PHCCs [Primary Healthcare Centres] and two maternity units in Kabarto I/II, Shariya and Mamreshan IDP camps (costs of staff, training, maintenance, laboratories, medicine, utilities, etc.) […]. The DoH [Directorate-General of Health, Duhok] in Dohuk and Nineveh allocates medical staff from the host community and IDPs to the PHCCs […]. Furthermore, NGOs contribute staff and maintenance services for the PHCCs […]. The PHCCs are open 24/7; services include diagnostics, treatment and prevention of communicable and non-communicable diseases, immunisation, especially for children under five years, maternal and child nutrition advice, supervision of births, pre- and antenatal care, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), health education and dental services […].' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 31). 'The quality of services was praised; 'even members of the host communities came into camps for treatment'. The service capacities of the PHCCs was successfully strengthened […]. The project monitors PHCCs (input). Patients are generally satisfied with the services (project monitoring data).' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 31).
		Outcome level (2): Improved emergency care through an operational Azadi Teaching Hospital emergency wing.	?	?	'At the time of the evaluation, construction is still ongoing, but completion is expected in 12/2019' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 32).
		Outcome level (3): Enhanced human capacities through strengthening of the Directorate-General of Health, Duhok.	Y	Y	'GIZ provides funding and technical support for the DoH [Directorate-General of Health, Duhok] (inputs). DoH [Directorate-General of Health, Duhok] contributes technical staff to assess training needs, to design MHPSS and primary healthcare training, to identify trainers and trainees, to provide logistical support and training venues, and to implement training […]. Experts from host communities, IDPs and refugees complete modular training on psychosocial counselling […] and, in turn, train health, social work and education staff […].' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq, p. 33) 'The DoH's [Directorate-General of Health, Duhok] capacity (as training provider) is strengthened […]. Stakeholders confirm that this is achieved to a

					high extent […]. Strengthening of human and DoH [Directorate-General of Health, Duhok] capacities improves healthcare in Dohuk Governorate (outcome) […].' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 33)
		Impact level (1): The project outcome of improved psychosocial care contributes to enhanced mental health and well-being, specifically of IDP women.	Y	Y	'The project supported the provision of psychosocial support to more than 130,000 persons in and out of camp (outcome indicator 1). It can be assumed that the activities impacted positively on people's well-being and mental health. In some cases, this was substantiated by studies […] or case studies […].' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 40) 'In the evaluation survey, stakeholders confirmed that [the] hypothesis […] 'better mental health and well-being through free provision of mental health services' is valid and was achieved to a medium extent […]' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p. 40)
		Impact level (2): The project outcome of improved healthcare services contributes to better maternal and child health.	Y	(Y)	'Stakeholders confirm that [the] hypothesis […] 'improved healthcare contributes to better maternal and child health' is valid and achieved to a high extent […]. The contributions of GIZ, DoH [Directorate-General of Health, Duhok] and international agencies are rated important to very important […].' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p.41)
		Impact level (3): The project outcome of improved healthcare services contributes to peaceful and inclusive development in Dohuk Province.	Y	(Y)	'In the evaluation survey, stakeholders confirm that [the] hypothesis […] 'health care services contribute to peaceful and inclusive development' is valid/true and achieved to a high extent […]. In the wider picture, the contributions of GIZ, partners and international agencies are equally important […]. Three stakeholders state that free service provision would be an excellent tool for promoting peaceful community relations […]. Three stakeholders emphasise that project contributions are limited […]; living conditions in the camps, for example, would have a greater influence […]. Indeed, it is not part of the project concept to enhance inclusiveness by promoting exchange between IDPs, refugees and host communities; the project only contributes indirectly, with a large attribution gap. Without the project, the health system would have been more overloaded, and unrest and conflict over limited health services would have been more likely' (CPE 7, 'Health Iraq', p.42)
Qudra CPE 10	**CPE 10**	**Outcome level (1):** Supported by the programme, a by-law was passed by the Jordanian Government as the first legal framework regulating safe school transportation, which improves safe access to schools also for vulnerable children.	Y	Y	'After intensive consultations with MoE, EU Delegation and BMZ in Amman, the Ministries of Education and Transport, Qudra advised on the drafting of the first ever legal framework regulating school transportation in the country, the by-law […] came into force on 15 November /2018 (JRI 1.2.1). Qudra developed and tested the pilot 'Smart Move' as innovative school transportation model in cooperation with the private sector; it serves as a model for a nationwide system. […] Qudra supported the development of vulnerability criteria for the transportability and the assessment of the compliance of vehicles and drivers with the required safety and qualification standards. […] This will improve safe access to schools also for vulnerable children. With Qudra's contribution more children and vulnerable children specifically can use safe and affordable transport which results in higher enrolment rates/lower drop-out rates of vulnerable children including girls. Better transportation conditions and inclusion of vulnerable children will contribute to enhanced educational conditions for refugees and host communities (JO 1-3). This hypothesis was confirmed for the pilot phase by the evaluation on the bases of evidence in the form of the new by-law, the pilot 'Smart Move', monitoring results of the programme, progress reports […] and feedback by respondents in Jordan including partner ministries, school administration, and target group […] (CPE 10 'Qudra', p. 72)

		Outcome level (2): Educational and economic opportunities for refugees and host communities are increased through demand-driven skills training provided by qualified training providers.	(Y)	(Y)	'[…] Young Syrians and Jordanians have been trained in at least three occupational fields; 5,000 young vulnerable Jordanian and Syrian students, (80% youth, of which 40% are female) are enrolled in at least 10 training centres; 1,000 (of the total 5,000) combine the skills training with practical work (via short-term employment and/or an apprenticeship) […]' (CPE 10 'Qudra', p. 73) 'This hypothesis was only partly confirmed by the evaluation on the bases of monitoring results and feedback by respondents in Jordan and Lebanon […]. Innovative labour market orientation, links to the private sector, and business promotion and support for start-ups were not fully developed, or missing, according to respondents in Jordan and Lebanon. The contribution to economic opportunities and increased employability cannot be fully confirmed according to feedback of respondents of relevant ministries, training providers, and beneficiaries. Evidence for increased employability based on national data and statistics were not available. The high implementation pressure seemed to have shifted the focus from quality to quantity (as many trainees as possible in short- term courses). Innovations created by the programme could not be observed […].' (CPE 10 'Qudra', p. 74)
		Outcome level (3): Social cohesion/ stability is increased through capacity development of community centres and PECs in Turkey and social development centres in Lebanon.	Y	Y	'Some 86% of Syrian and 74% of Turkish respondents in Kilis confirmed in the context of the social cohesion survey that the activities at the supported centres improved social cohesion (TOI 3.3). It was reported that interaction, empathy, dialogue and friendship among Turkish and Syrian participants increased. Participants got to know their neighbours and peers better from courses and engage more. People that had met during trips and events exchanged contact information and remained in contact or even visited each other in their homes. The interaction of Qudra (between 5 and 6 months) was too short to show direct impact and the sample sizes of the survey and focus group discussions, were not fully representative. […] Based on the evidence of monitoring results and progress reports of the programme, the social cohesion survey of Qudra, and the social distance survey of Expertise France the hypothesis was confirmed, that the outputs contributed to higher capacities and competencies of teachers and social workers (of SDCs, YCs and PECs), the establishment of a referral system for psychosocial support, and better informed and better qualified refugees and host communities […]. They contribute to the outcome to foster social cohesion between refugees and host communities in Turkey. Responses of political partners, implementing partners, local administrations, civil society, and beneficiaries during interviews and focus group discussions confirmed the hypothesis and added further evidence […]' (CPE 10, 'Qudra', p. 75)
		Impact level (1): The rehabilitation of schools and facility management lead to improved learning conditions and contribute to overall improved framework conditions for refugees and host communities.	Y	Y	'Evidence to confirm this hypothesis was found in the baseline and endline surveys conducted by Qudra, monitoring results and progress reports […]. Responses of relevant ministries, school administrations, teachers and beneficiaries in interviews and focus group discussions confirmed the hypothesis and added further evidence' (CPE 10, 'Qudra', p.87) 'Being a member of the School Infrastructure Donor Group, Qudra was involved and contributed substantially in the planning and execution of school rehabilitation measures in Jordan. Qudra's intervention logic allowed to support systematic sectoral policy reforms and contributed to structural changes in national public school

					transportation and facility management of the Jordanian partners. This contributed to the impact. The baseline survey was conducted in 10/2017 and after the completion of the rehabilitation measures (3/2019). Qudra conducted an endline survey stating considerable improved physical conditions, thus confirming an improved teaching and learning environment through the activities. In Lebanon Qudra conducted the baseline survey in 10/2017 and, following the completion of the rehabilitation measures in 11/2018 and 08/2019, an endline survey with respondents who confirmed considerably improved teaching and learning environments through improved physical infrastructure […]'(CPE 10, 'Qudra', p.87)
		Impact level (2): Fostering social cohesion/stability leads to positive life prospects and also contributes to improved framework conditions.	Y	Y	'Evidence for this hypothesis was found in monitoring results and progress reports, impact studies of SRHC [support for refugees and host communities], Expertise France and CFI [L'Agence Française de Coopération Médias] […]. Responses of relevant stakeholders in interviews and focus group discussions confirmed the hypothesis and added further evidence […]. According to the impact study of Expertise France the viewpoints of Turkish and Syrian groups about each other have changed positively and prejudices have decreased as a result of the Qudra's intervention […]. The process of change started with fear and shyness and showed the development of increasing intimacy, acquaintance and cohesion as the interaction increased. It was concluded that the gains obtained through skills development and socio-cultural activities are professional, personal, social, cultural and economic gains. […]' (CPE 10, 'Qudra', p.88)
		Impact level (3): Improvement of basic and social services and capacitated local administrations lead to better living conditions and contribute to a coherent and improved aid response to the Syrian crisis.	Y	Y	'The establishment of financing instruments […] for the rehabilitation of basic social, economic and physical infrastructure and the strengthening of the articulation and prioritisation of needs by the population and civil society has enhanced local development processes and made them more efficient and responsive, thus increasing their acceptance by the population […]. Adaptation capacities have been strengthened by empowering vulnerable population groups, CBOs [community-based organisation] and local institutions through inclusive and participatory approaches, as well as through innovative dialogue formats to improve their ability to meet their basic needs in the face of the ongoing crisis (Jordan and KRI [Kurdistan region of Iraq]). The self-help capacity of most vulnerable population groups was strengthened through the promotion of vocational qualifications and income generating opportunities (Jordan and KRI). Their productive livelihoods have become more stable and the diversification of sources of income has been strengthened, contributing to the mobilisation of local resources and economic cycles. This contributes to improved framework conditions for refugees and host communities in the neighbouring countries of Syria and in the KRI. The impact strengthens and improves a coherent aid response to the Syrian crisis on a regional scale and addresses the needs of refugees, IDPs, returnees, and vulnerable host communities. Evidence for this hypothesis was found in Qudra monitoring results and progress reports, the Satisfaction and Perception Study by AECID [Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo] in Jordan, the governance study of ARDD [Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development] in Jordan, and final reports of HIA [Hungarian Interchurch Aid], LWF

					[The Lutheran World Federation] and REACH [Rehabilitation, Education and Community Health] in KRI […]. These evidences could be confirmed in interviews and focus group discussion with local administrations, service providers and beneficiaries in KRI and Jordan' (CPE 10, 'Qudra', p.90)
		Impact level (4): Enhancing exchange and learning on policies and approaches creates future prospects of indirect target groups and contributes to overall improved framework conditions.	(Y)	(Y)	'Innovative exchange and dialogue formats (all partner countries) have served as instruments for the implementation of specific measures and connecting activities within the framework of the other modules with a positive effect on social cohesion. In a conflict-laden environment, consolidated by competition for scarce resources and exacerbated by the protracted refugee and IDP crises, productive exchanges and the search for constructive and sustainable solutions contribute to reducing social tensions and enhancing peaceful co-existence. […] The evidence for this hypothesis was found in Qudra monitoring results and progress reports, in GIZ Evaluation and Documentation of Lessons Learned and Best Practices of The EU Innovation Madad Labs, the Qudra module 5: 'Dialogue and Dissemination': Urban Practitioners' Dialogues and Workshops between Turkish and German Municipalities Refugee Friendly Municipalities' […]. (CPE 10, 'Qudra', p.91) 'The hypothesis was confirmed to a limited extent with regard to the expected effect that learning and exchange between the SOs [specific objectives] and the individual countries could only be partially implemented. Strengths and impacts of other specific objectives could only partly be deepened to achieve impact. However, this is not necessarily due to the approach of SO5, but to the regional context and the relationship between the individual countries and the high implementation pressure of the SOs, which left hardly any time for comprehensive activities […] (CPE 10, 'Qudra', p.91)

Note: Y= yes, confirmed, (Y)= partly confirmed, N= not confirmed, ?= evidence provided does not allow assessment, N/A = No information available in CPE.

Annex IV: Assessment of Data Quality

In order to be able to deliver methodologically durable results, the data provided is assessed regarding its methodological quality. For this purpose, the CPE reports are examined according to 10 indicators for quality measurement of project evaluations (see *Figure 8*). The calculations have shown that the overall accuracy of the 10 CPE reports analysed amounts to an average of 90.9%. That is, seven of 10 reports achieved an accuracy of or above 90%, two reports reached a value between 85% and 89% whereas one report achieved an accuracy of only 66%. A closer look at the individual indicators reveals that the best rated indicator is "framework conditions" with an average percentage of 97.6% and the worst rated indicator is ‘systematic error checking’ with an average of 80%. To resume, the overall quality of the CPE reports can be considered relatively homogeneous; only the CPE report from Ukraine (‘Building emergency capacities in Ukraine’) shows clear methodological deficits. These relate in particular to a significant lack of reliable and accessible baseline data; inconsistent quality of partner reporting and incomplete monitoring of data resulting in difficulties to measure output and outcome as well as to triangulate and validate data.

Figure 7: Average percentage of the 10 CPE reports achieved (in %)



Apart from that, the data available in the 10 CPEs are mostly qualitative (mainly interviews with relevant stakeholders and document analysis, including (quantified) monitoring data) and thus contribute to the generation of knowledge with all their methodological strengths and weaknesses. After a detailed examination of the overall data quality of the available CPE reports it can be confirmed that they contain sufficient evidence to perform a corresponding synthesis.

Annex V: Analysis grid Block A

Dimension	Question	Category	Coding
1. General trends and challenges	1.1 Which general trends and challenges in transitional development assistance can be identified or substantiated by the QSA?	1.1.1 TDA related trends/ observable changes over time	Open, project staff (AV and PMI)
		1.1.2 TDA related challenges	Open, project staff (AV and PMI)
2. (General) Success and failure factors	2.1 Which success and failure factors of transitional development assistance projects can be identified and presented synoptically?	2.1.1 Success factors	Open
		2.1.2 Failure factors	Open
	2.2 Which transitional development assistance related and context-specific recommendations can be derived from this?	2.2.1 TDA related recommendations	Axial (1.1.1, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 3.2.1)
3. Results hypotheses/approaches	3.1 Which results hypotheses/approaches can be derived for specific sectors/areas/topics and contexts, and which of them have	3.1.1 Causal assumption at outcome level	Open
		3.1.2 Causal assumption at impact level	Open

	proven themselves?	3.1.3 Sector/area/type of activity (that hypothesis relates to)	Open
		3.1.4 Success of activity at outcome level	Open
		3.1.5 Success of activity at impact level	Open
		3.1.6 Proof of hypothesis	Axial (3.1.1-5, 3.2.1)
	3.2 In which contexts are which results hypotheses/approaches effective? To what extent are these specific to the field of transitional development assistance?	3.2.1 Implementation context	Open
		3.2.2 TDA related features of results hypothesis	Open
	3.3 How was the humanitarian development peace nexus addressed?	3.3.1 Cooperation between development, humanitarian and peace actors	project staff (AV and PMI)
4. Indicators	4.1 Which indicators and what type of indicators were used at outcome level and, where appropriate, at output level and how was their quality assessed?	4.1.1 Output indicator	Open
		4.1.2 Outcome indicator	Open
		4.1.3.a-… Type of indicator	Inductive
		4.1.4.a-e Indicator quality (according to SMART criteria)	Selective (according to rating scale), project staff (AV and PMI)
	4.2 Which standard or exemplary indicators for relevant transitional development assistance projects and cross-cutting issues can be derived?	4.2.1.a-… Standard/exemplary indicator	Axial (3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.2), project staff (AV and PMI)
5. Impact contributions	5.1 Which goals at impact level were explicitly and implicitly addressed?	5.1.1 (Implicit and explicit) goal description	Open
	5.2 To what extent has been contributed to these?	5.2.1 Project contribution to impact	Open, project staff (AV and PMI)
6. Non-intended negative effects	6.1 Which non-intended positive effects and which non-intended negative effects or risks can be identified across projects?	6.1.1 Non-intended positive effects	Open
		6.1.2 Non-intended negative effects	Open
		6.1.3 Risks	Open
		6.1.4 Common side effects	Axial (3.1.2, 3.2.1, 6.1.1-3)

Annex VI: Analysis grid Block B

Variable	Indicator	Assessment scale	Data source
Causal conditions			
Quality and use of (I)PCA or equivalent	Quality of (I)PCA	1. (I)PCA of low quality (more than one component of the (I)PCA is completely missing OR more than two components are only superficially described) 2. (I)PCA of rather low quality (1 out of 4 components of the (I)PCA is completely missing OR all (I)PCA components are taken into account, but two of them are only superficially described) 3. (I)PCA of rather high quality (all (I)PCA components are taken into account and three out of four have been described in detail) 4. (I)PCA of high quality (all (I)PCA components are taken into account and described in detail)	(I)PCA, GIZ evaluation department, References and document table/ literature list in CPE, GIZ evaluation department
	Use of (I)PCA	1. (I)PCA was not used at all 2. (I)PCA of a similar project (e.g. preceding project) was used but no own IPCA was developed)	CPE, project staff (AV and PMI)

		3. (I)PCA was used to a limited extent (only at the beginning of the project to obtain a general overview, but beyond that there was no intensive use; IPCA was not regularly updated, IPCA did not influence the implementation) 4. (I)PCA was extensively used (formed an important part in the implementation of the project)	
Quality of results-based monitoring	./.	1. Lack of formalised results-based monitoring (majority of output and outcome indicators not monitored and/or no periodic data collection, lack of baseline data) 2. Comparatively weak results-based monitoring (mainly activity monitoring and/or only output indicators monitored, no systematic data collection, not being up to date, lack of baseline data, lack of outcome monitoring) 3. Comparatively good results-based monitoring (majority of output indicators monitored, being up to date, lack of systematic outcome monitoring, baseline data may be set a zero or partly missing) 4. Comparatively very good results-based monitoring applied (systematic and regular data collection, baseline data available and not generally set at zero, covering relevant indicators at output and outcome level, being up to date, oriented at current results model and/or results matrix)	References (e.g. in evaluability assessment) and document table/ literature list in CPE
Quality of conflict-sensitive monitoring (including risk monitoring)	./.	1. Lack of conflict-sensitive monitoring 2. Conflict-sensitive monitoring is neither systematic nor comprehensive, but at least informal (e.g. through informal and irregular exchange rounds) 3. Systematic and comprehensive/ formal conflict-sensitive monitoring, source: calculation based on CPEs.	CPE, evaluators, project staff (manager, M&E officer), Effectiveness and impact chapter (dimension 3), monitoring chapter and relevance chapter of CPE
State fragility *(from analysis grid Block A)*	Fragile State Index	Average rating of state fragility: 1. v_{min} to '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' 2. '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' to '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/2$' 3. '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/2$' to '$v_{min} + 3 * (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' 4. '$3 * (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' to v_{max} v_{min}: minimum value of all indices v_{max}: maximum value of all indices	
Indicator quality according to SMART criteria *(from analysis grid Block A)*	./.	1. The indicator quality is low (the project indicators cover less than 50% of the SMART criteria) 2. The indicator quality is rather low (the project indicators cover between 51% and 64% of the SMART criteria) 3. The indicator quality is rather high (the project indicators cover between 65% and 79% of the SMART criteria) 4. The indicator quality is high (the project indicators cover between 65% and 80% of the SMART criteria)	
Type of indicator *(from analysis grid Block A)*	./.	1. Broad 2. Rather broad 3. Rather Narrow 4. Narrow	
Timely, transparent, evidence-based decisions (adaptive management)	Adaptation of project management	Category formation based on the relative distribution regarding adaptation of project management 1. v_{min} to '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' 2. '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' to '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/2$' 3. '$v_{min} + (v_{max} - v_{min})/2$' to '$v_{min} + 3 * (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' 4. '$3 * (v_{max} - v_{min})/4$' to v_{max}	CPE (especially relevance chapter, dimension 4) evaluators, project staff (AV and PMI)

		v_{min}: minimum value of all average ratings v_{max}: maximum value of a average ratings	
Outcome variables			
Project success	./.	Average rating of project effectiveness and impact: 1. v_{min} to 'v_{min} + (v_{max} – v_{min})/4' 2. 'v_{min} + (v_{max} – v_{min})/4' to 'v_{min} + (v_{max} – v_{min})/2' 3. 'v_{min} + (v_{max} – v_{min})/2' to 'v_{min} + 3 * (v_{max} – v_{min})/4' 4. '3 * (v_{max} – v_{min})/4' to v_{max} v_{min}: minimum value of all average ratings v_{max}: maximum value of a average ratings	CPE, effectiveness chapter dimension 1 (target achievement) & dimension 2 (project contribution); impact chapter dimension 2
Non-intended negative effects	-/.	1. Non-intended negative effects were observed 2. Non-intended negative effects were not observed	CPE

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

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